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DISENFRANCHISE THIS:  STATE VOTER ID 
LAWS AND THEIR DISCONTENTS, A 
BLUEPRINT FOR BRINGING SUCCESSFUL 
EQUAL PROTECTION AND POLL TAX CLAIMS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the passage of the Help America Vote Act in 2002,1 nearly half 
of the states have enacted some form of an identification requirement as 
a prerequisite to in-person voting.2  Proponents argue that such laws are 
necessary to combat alleged voter fraud.3  While the actual scope of voter 
fraud, particularly in-person voter fraud, is widely disputed, state voter 
identification laws are becoming increasingly prevalent.4  In fact, 
                                                 
1 Help America Vote Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15401-15406 (Supp. IV 2000) [hereinafter HAVA].  
“The first focused effort by Congress to regulate the actual mechanisms by which elections 
are administered, HAVA set forth comprehensive requirements designed ‘to assist in the 
administration of Federal elections and . . . to establish minimum election administration 
standards for States and units of local government.’”  Developments in the Law-Voting and 
Democracy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1148 (2006) [hereinafter Voter Identification Laws]. 
2 As of August 1, 2006, twenty-four states required voters to show identification prior to 
voting, seven of which required photo identification.  See National Conference of State 
Legislatures, State Requirements for Voter ID, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/ 
elect/taskfc/VoterIDReq.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2007) [hereinafter National Conference of 
State Legislatures].  While seven states currently request photo identification, most allow 
alternatives.  See David H. Harris Jr., Georgia Photo ID Requirement: Proof Positive of the Need 
to Extend Section 5, 28 N.C. CENT. L.J. 172, 182 (2006) [hereinafter Proof Positive] (listing 
examples of alternatives); see also Ariel Hart, Georgia Voters May Soon Need Photo IDs, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, at A15 [hereinafter Hart I] (comparing photo ID requirements in 
different states).  However, as of August 1, 2006, four states had strictly mandated that only 
government-issued photo IDs will be accepted for in-person voting.  See National Conference 
of State Legislatures supra. 
3 See Voter Identification Laws, supra note 1, at 1146 n.4.  Drawing mostly on anecdotal 
evidence, state legislators complain of inflated voter rolls, purchased votes, and ballots cast 
by illegal immigrants, felons, and the deceased.  See American Center for Voting Rights, 
Vote Fraud, Intimidation & Suppression in the 2004 Presidential Election, http://www.ac4vr. 
com/reports/072005/default.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2006) (detailing findings of alleged 
voter fraud in several states); see also Voter Identification Laws, supra note 1, at 1145 
(describing “bloated” voter rolls, containing the names of felons and the deceased). 
4 See Voter Identification Laws, supra note 1, at 1152-53 (describing how reports can 
overstate the extent of voter fraud and the actual effect it has on elections).  Thus far, in 
cases involving voter ID laws in Indiana, Georgia, and Missouri, the courts have all noted 
the lack of evidence documenting in-person voter fraud in those states.  See Common 
Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1361, 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2005) [hereinafter 
Common Cause I]; Common Cause/Georigia v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1350 (N.D. Ga. 
2006) [hereinafter Common Cause II]; Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 
775, 792-93, 826 (S.D. Ind. 2006); Weinschenk v. Mo., 203 S.W.3d 201, 217 (Mo. 2006). 
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Congress recently took a cue from the states and began considering a 
national voter identification requirement as well.5   
Creating the greatest controversy are a few states that have passed 
statutes requiring every in-person voter to show a government-issued 
photo ID before casting a ballot.6  Because these extra-stringent laws 
have the potential to disenfranchise registered voters lacking proper 
identification, they have provoked heated partisan debate, spurring a 
flurry of litigation.7  In particular, the disproportionate impact that these 
                                                 
5 Federal Election Integrity Act, H.R. 4844, 109th Cong. (2006) (this Act is not listed in 
the Code and did not appear in the House Bill Status report which might suggest that it 
was not passed).  In September of 2006, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the 
Federal Election Integrity Act, modeled after State voter ID laws to require proof of 
citizenship and photo ID to vote in the 2008 election.  The Act passed the House of 
Representatives by a vote of 228 to 195.  See Marc H. Morial, National Voter ID Legislation 
Poses Direct Threat to Right to Vote, 101 CHI. DEFENDER 87, Oct. 4. 2006.  Some perceived the 
bill as merely election year politics, but several Senators were greatly alarmed by the 
sweeping bill and asked that it not be brought to vote in the Senate.  See Senate Democrats 
Decry Modern-Day Poll Tax, U.S. FED. NEWS, Sept. 22, 2006; Democratic Members of the Senate 
and House of Representatives Hold a News Conference on the Voter ID Requirement Bill, FDCH 
CAPITAL TRANSCRIPTS, Sept. 27, 2006; Adam Cohen, American Elections and the Grand Old 
Tradition of Disenfranchisement, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, at § 4 (claiming that the proposed 
bill undermines American democracy).  See also Morial supra (stating “Americans are as 
likely to commit election fraud as they are getting killed by lightening.  Since October of 
2002, a total of 86 U.S. residents have been convicted of federal election fraud, while nearly 
197,000,000 ballots have been cast in general elections.”).  Specifically, members of 
Congress concerned with the proposed law characterized it as a poll tax which would 
unnecessarily disenfranchise millions of American voters.  See This Poll Tax Isn’t Welcome, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 8, 2006, at E8: 
Two days after the House vote, a report by the widely respected 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities showed that some 11 million 
citizens don’t have a birth certificate or a passport in their home. The 
elderly are far more likely to lack such documents than the nonelderly; 
low-income residents were nearly twice as likely not to have them. The 
script almost starts to write itself: About 2 million black and 4.5 million 
rural residents also lack the required documents, according to the 
report. No matter how you slice it, the numbers amount to a serious 
dismantling of voting rights. 
Id. 
6 These extra-stringent laws are the subject of this Note.  At the time of this writing, 
Georgia, Indiana, Missouri, Arizona, South Dakota, and Ohio had passed voter ID statutes 
with this extra-stringent requirement.  See National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 
2. 
7 See infra Part II  (describing partisan passage of voter ID laws, the potential for such 
laws to disenfranchise some voters, and subsequent litigation); see also Voter Identification 
Laws, supra note 1, at 1146 (introducing the argument that the democratic process is better 
served by encouraging broad participation in the electoral process and limiting voting 
restrictions which have the potential to discourage or disrupt voting).  But see IDs and Voter 
Confidence Political Parties are Bitterly Divided on an Issue it Behooves Them to Work Together 
On, FORT WAYNE NEWS SENTINEL, Oct. 19, 2006, at A6: 
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laws may have on the indigent, elderly, disabled, and minority voters 
raises great concern regarding the constitutionality and morality of such 
laws.8  
Using the extra-stringent voter ID statutes of Indiana, Georgia, and 
Missouri as case studies, Part II of this Note will provide a factual 
background, discussing the legislative history, concerns of 
disenfranchisement, and subsequent judicial treatment of each law.9  
Focusing specifically on Equal Protection and poll tax challenges, Part III 
of this Note will undertake a more detailed analysis of the case law by 
distinguishing factors that contribute to successful claims.10  Finally, Part 
IV of this Note will offer a blueprint for successful challenges against 
state voter ID laws, synthesizing trends gleaned from the cases decided 
thus far.11  
II.  BACKGROUND 
Before undertaking a detailed legal analysis of state voter ID laws, it 
is important to appreciate that the requirements and issues they create 
are relatively novel and judicially untested.12  While most states have 
long required some form of identification to vote, the absolute 
requirement to show a government-issued photo ID, exclusive of all 
                                                                                                             
It seems clear that Republicans are not just interested in fraud.  The 
most likely kinds of fraud - people who vote in two states, for example, 
or cheat on absentee ballots - are not addressed by photo IDs.  But it’s 
also obvious that Democrats are not just interested in protecting the 
rights of the downtrodden.  This is about each side getting as many 
votes as it can in a bitter political culture and at a time when big 
elections can be decided in a handful of precincts.  In the process of 
waging this war, the two parties are making weary, suspicious voters 
have even less faith in the system. 
Id. 
8 Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1365-66 (N.D. Ga. 2005) 
(“Common Cause I”): 
Unfortunately, the Photo ID requirement is most likely to prevent 
Georgia’s elderly, poor, and African-American voters from voting.  For 
those citizens, the character and magnitude of their injury—the loss of 
their right to vote—is undeniably demoralizing and extreme, as those 
citizens are likely to have no other realistic or effective means of 
protecting their rights. 
Id. 
9 See generally infra Part II. 
10 See generally infra Part III. 
11 See generally infra Part IV. 
12 In 2005, Indiana was the first state to mandate a government issued photo ID to vote.  
See infra notes 47-57 (discussing promulgation of the first voter ID statute only a few years 
ago). 
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other forms of identification, is new.13  The creation and subsequent 
adjudication of state voter ID requirements represent a prime example of 
developing law, evidencing both the laboratory of the states and the 
crucible of the courtroom.14  The state voter ID laws, thus far enacted, 
have been markedly similar in both creation and effect, raising the same 
political, social, and legal concerns through nearly identical 
requirements.15  The developing judicial treatment of the statutes has 
been more fluid, however, with courts taking different approaches of 
analysis and producing divergent outcomes.16   
Given the newness of this rapidly developing area of law, this Note 
takes a conservative approach in order to establish more reliable 
conclusions regarding the anticipated direction of the developing law.17  
Part II.A begins by providing a brief overview of relevant election law 
precedent.18  Next, Part II.B consecutively introduces the enactment and 
subsequent judicial treatment of three current voter ID statutes.19  In 
doing so, Part II also highlights the similar requirements, legislative 
history, and concerns raised by all three laws.20  Additionally, Part II 
discusses the distinct judicial treatment that each law has encountered, in 
regard to Equal Protection and poll tax challenges.21  The sharply 
divergent judicial outcomes spawning from nearly identical statutes lay 
the foundation for subsequent legal analysis in Part III.22   
A. Brief Overview of Federal Election Law Under Equal Protection and Poll 
Tax Precedent 
In order to best understand the legal challenges raised as a result of 
the recently enacted state voter ID laws, a basic understanding of the 
                                                 
13 For example, prior to adoption of its stringent voter ID law, Georgia permitted eight 
forms of identification to vote, including a birth certificate, a social security card, a copy of 
a current utility bill, a government check, a payroll check, or a bank statement with the 
voter’s name and address.  See Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1331. 
14 See generally infra Part II and Part III.  The structure of this Note is that of a comparison 
and contrast of the similar requirements and divergent judicial treatment of the initial state 
voter ID statutes. 
15 See generally infra notes 47-57, 77-85, 120-26 (introducing the similarities in 
development and requirement of the earliest voter ID laws). 
16 See generally infra notes 58-76, 86-119, 127-136 (discussing the divergent judicial 
treatment of the earliest voter ID laws). 
17 See generally infra Part II and Part III. 
18 See generally infra Part II.A. 
19 See generally infra Part II.B. 
20 See supra note 15. 
21 See supra note 16. 
22 See generally infra Part III. 
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legal tests used to analyze them is necessary.23  Part II.A.1 introduces the 
legal tests used for Equal Protection challenges, and Part II.A.2 
introduces the tests under the Twenty-Fourth Amendment’s prohibition 
of Poll Tax laws.24   
1. Challenges under Equal Protection:  Election Laws Imposing an 
Undue Burden  
The right to vote is a fundamental right - arguably, the most 
important fundamental right.25  Voting is the way citizens impact the 
legislative process in a representative democracy.26  Indeed, voting is 
“preservative of other basic civil and political rights” and demands extra 
judicial protection.27  The right to vote, however, is not absolute.28  
Instead, the states have some authority to impose voter qualifications 
and regulate elections.29  For instance, the United States Constitution 
grants the states the ability to establish time, place, and manner 
regulations on federal elections.30  This power is limited, however, as 
state voting regulations may not unduly burden or abridge the right to 
vote.31   
When a state-imposed election regulation has the potential to 
disenfranchise some voters, the regulation may be challenged on 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection grounds.32  Courts considering 
                                                 
23 This section borrows heavily, in both structure and substance, from the legal 
standards laid out in Common Cause I.  See generally Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 
1359-61, 1366-68 (N.D. Ga. 2005).  Because this section attempts only to present a basic 
overview of current election law precedent, particularly in regards to Equal Protection and 
poll tax challenges, the concise explanations in the Common Cause I decision were used 
without much deviation.  After introducing the legal frameworks used to analyze election 
law challenges, this Note proceeds in a more detailed description of how recent cases have 
employed these methods to analyze state voter ID laws. 
24 See generally infra Part II.A and accompanying text.  These tests will be referenced 
frequently in subsequent sections when discussing the legal analysis of state voter ID laws. 
25 See Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1359 (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 
433 (1992)). 
26 See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (“No right is more precious in a free 
country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under 
which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the 
right to vote is undermined.”). 
27 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). 
28 See Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1359 (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 
336 (1972)). 
29 Id. 
30 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
31 See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986). 
32 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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such challenges have traditionally applied the strict scrutiny analysis, 
requiring that the regulation employ narrowly tailored means to 
accomplish a compelling regulatory interest.33  In more recent cases, 
however, courts have not automatically applied strict scrutiny analysis to 
all regulations impacting the right to vote, but instead apply the more 
flexible Burdick test.34  Under the Burdick test, a court must balance the 
“character and magnitude” of the harm imposed on the right to vote 
against the state’s reason for enacting the regulation and the necessity of 
the regulation.35  When using the Burdick test, courts possess discretion 
to utilize either strict scrutiny or a standard similar to rational basis to 
review the challenged regulation, depending on how “severe” the court 
determines the imposed harm to be.36  If the court determines that the 
right to vote is severely harmed by a state regulation, the court will 
proceed under strict scrutiny analysis.37  However, if the court 
determines that the right to vote is not severely harmed, it will proceed 
under a rational basis-like review, requiring only that the regulation be 
reasonable to advance an important regulatory interest.38   
2. Challenges under the Twenty-Fourth Amendment:  Election Laws 
Imposing a Cost 
A second constitutional challenge, common in every decision thus 
far decided, are allegations that state voter ID laws impose a material 
requirement on the right to vote, in violation of the Twenty-Fourth 
Amendment.39  The Twenty-Fourth Amendment provides:  “The right of 
citizens of the United States to vote . . . shall not be denied or abridged 
by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax 
or other tax.”40  A poll tax has been defined as the imposition of any 
                                                 
33 See, eg., Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1361-62.  For purposes of simplification, 
this will be hereinafter referred to as “outright strict scrutiny analysis.” 
34 See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34 (1992). 
35 See Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1360 (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 
433 (1992)). 
36 Id.; see also infra note 38 and accompanying text (briefly discussing the elements of 
rational basis review). 
37 See, e.g., Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1360.  For purposes of simplification, this 
will be hereinafter referred to as “strict scrutiny analysis under the Burdick test.” 
38 Id.  For purposes of simplification, this will be hereinafter referred to as “rational basis 
analysis under the Burdick test.” 
39 See infra notes 69-74, 101-05, 113-16, 130-33 and accompanying text (discussing poll tax 
challenges to voter ID laws in Indiana, Georgia, and Missouri). 
40 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.  Poll tax laws have historically been used to discourage 
unwanted voters from participating in federal elections by imposing material requirements 
on the right to vote.  See generally Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1367-68 (citing 
examples of unconstitutional poll taxes). 
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material requirement on the voting process in order to discourage voting 
or to deflect the administrative costs of an election.41  The requirement 
need not be monetary or of high value to run afoul of the prohibition, so 
long as the requirement is a “material” hurdle that the voter must 
overcome before exercising her right.42  The most common way a poll tax 
is imposed is through a direct or primary cost on the right to vote, such 
as a voting “fee.”  However, courts have considered the imposition of 
poll taxes through incidental or secondary costs as well.43  Secondary 
costs are not directly imposed by the challenged regulation, instead, they 
are often imposed as a result of overlapping regulations.44  Whether the 
challenge is against primary or secondary costs, it is within the court’s 
discretion to determine whether a regulation imposes an impermissible 
material requirement on the right to vote or merely imposes a 
permissible and tangential burden.45 
B. Factual Background and Subsequent Judicial Treatment of Three State 
Voter ID Laws 
This section will simultaneously introduce the enacted voter ID 
statutes, highlighting their similar history and purpose and noting their 
disputed constitutionality.46 
1.  Indiana 
On July 1, 2005, amidst heavy partisan disagreement, Indiana 
became the first state to require a government-issued picture ID (“photo 
ID”) as an absolute condition for in-person voting.47  The Indiana law 
mandated that all in-person voters present a photo ID card before casting 
                                                 
41 See generally Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1367-69; Indiana Democratic Party v. 
Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 826-27 (S.D. Ind. 2006). 
42 Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1367-69. 
43 Claims against secondary costs are more common in cases involving state voter ID 
laws.  See, e.g., Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1354-55 (N.D. Ga. 2005); Rokita, 458 F. 
Supp. 2d at 827. 
44 See, e.g., Weinschenk v. Mo, 203 S.W.3d 201, 207-08 (discussing the overlapping 
requirements of Missouri’s voter ID law and the federal REAL ID Act). 
45 See generally Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1367-69; Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 826-
27. 
46 See generally infra Part II.B. 
47 IND. CODE §§ 3-5-2-40.5; 3-10-1-7.2; 3-10-8-25 (2006).  Prior to enactment of the new 
law, Indiana did not require any form of identification at the polls, relying instead on 
signature comparisons, voter challenges, and criminal penalties to catch and deter in-
person voter fraud.  Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 788; see also id. at 783 (stating that “[t]his 
litigation is the result of a partisan legislative disagreement that has spilled out of the state 
house into the courts.”). 
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a ballot.48  According to the provisions of the statute, the state was 
required to issue free photo IDs to all registered voters who are at least 
eighteen years old and who lack a valid driver’s license.49  Similar to 
voter ID statutes in other states, the proffered legislative purpose for 
enacting Indiana’s law was preventing voter fraud.50  However, at the 
time of its passage, there was no evidence of in-person voter fraud in 
Indiana.51  Instead, the state justified its actions as a means of combating 
potential in-person fraud, as well as decreasing voter perception of 
fraud.52   
When Indiana adopted its voter ID law, the number of registered 
Indiana voters who lacked a requisite government-issued photo ID was 
in dispute.53  Nevertheless, it was predicted by opponents that the new 
law would decrease voter turnout among minorities, the disabled, and 
                                                 
48 Voters without the requisite card are permitted to cast a provisional ballot on the day 
of an election, conditioned on the voter presenting acceptable photo identification to the 
circuit court clerk or to the county election board within ten days after the election.  IND. 
CODE §§ 3-11-8-25.1(e), 3-11-7.5-2.5(a) (2006).  Further, the law permits voters without photo 
identification due to indigence to cast a provisional ballot, conditioned on the voter 
returning to the clerk’s office within ten days to sign a poverty affidavit.  IND. CODE § 3-
11.7-5-1 (2006).  Additionally, the stringent requirements of the new law are not applicable 
to absentee voting or to votes cast from state licensed care facilities.  IND. CODE §§ 3-10-1-
7.2(e), 3-11-8-10-1.2 (2006). 
49 IND. CODE § 9-24-16-10 (2006). 
50 Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 825, 826. 
51 The Rokita court noted plaintiffs’ evidence that no Indiana voter has ever been charged 
with attempted in-person voter fraud and that evidence of such fraud was not presented 
during enactment of Indiana’s voter ID law.  Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 792-93.  But see 
Crawford v. Marion County Elec. Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007) (Judge Posner argued 
that the lack of proven in-person fraud was due to difficulty detecting in-person fraud 
rather than proof that it didn’t actually occur in Indiana).  The court also noted that the 
defendants’ conceded that the state is unaware of any evidence of in-person voter fraud in 
Indiana.  Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 792-93.  However, when the law was passed, there was 
evidence of absentee voter fraud and inflated voter rolls; voting areas which were left 
untouched by the new voter ID statute.  See Pabey v. Pastrick, 816 N.E.2d 1138 (Ind. 2004) 
(Indiana Supreme Court vacated the results of East Chicago’s mayoral election due to 
pervasive absentee voter fraud).  See also Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 793 (discussing the 
“Benson Report,” estimating Indiana’s voter inflation are among the highest in the 
country); Niki Kelly, Parties Bicker over Voter Lists Disagree on How to Fix Inaccuracies, THE J. 
GAZETTE, June 15, 2006, at 1C; Niki Kelly, Bipartisan Plan Seeks Cleaned-up VoterRolls, THE J. 
GAZETTE, June 24, 2006, at 3C [hereinafter Bipartisan Plan]. 
52 The state presented evidence of in-person voting fraud in other states.  Rokita, 458 F. 
Supp. 2d at 793-94.  The state also argued that “perception” of fraud impacted voter 
confidence in the election system.  Id. at 794. 
53 The Rokita court concluded that the Brace Report submitted by the plaintiffs for the 
purposes of estimating the scope of potential disenfranchisement was “utterly incredible 
and unreliable.”  Id. at 803.  The Brace Report estimated that potentially 989,000 registered 
Indiana voters lacked photo identification.  Id. 
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the elderly.54  In particular, the time and financial burdens incidental to 
obtaining a birth certificate, a necessary prerequisite for obtaining an 
Indiana voter ID, concerned those serving vulnerable populations.55  
Chiefly, opponents argued that the often difficult and frustrating process 
of obtaining a birth certificate might cause some eligible voters to forgo 
voting.56  However, proponents of the law saw these concerns as 
unwarranted, especially because the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles 
successfully issued more than 82,000 voter IDs in the year between the 
law’s adoption and the federal mid-term elections in November 2006.57   
a. Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita 
In the spring of 2005, Indiana’s voter ID law was challenged in 
federal court on state and federal constitutional claims.58  Before 
beginning its analysis, the Rokita court extensively considered the factual 
background of Indiana’s voter ID law.59  The court acknowledged the 
lack of evidence of in-person voter fraud in Indiana and noted the 
                                                 
54 The Rokita court discussed a report by Professor Marjorie Hershey of Indiana 
University [hereinafter Hershey Report] which concluded that the time, transportation, and 
fees needed to obtain the necessary documentation, “threaten[ed] to be most difficult for 
the disabled, homeless, persons with limited income, those without cars, people of color, 
those who are part of ‘language minorities,’ and the elderly.”  Id. at 795 (internal quotations 
omitted).  The Rokita court also noted depositions and reports that were submitted to warn 
of potential disenfranchisement of disabled, homeless, and elderly voters in Indiana.  Id. at 
795-96.  These concerns were magnified by the decreasing availability of BMV branches in 
Indiana and a lack of proposed voter education.  See id. at 792 (noting closure of several 
BMV branches in Indiana, increasing travel costs for some Indiana voters); see also 
Bipartisan Plan supra note 51 (discussing proposed voter education). 
55 Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 791-92. 
56 The Rokita court noted affidavits of registered voters who had difficulty obtaining 
birth certificates.  Id. at 791 n.18 (citing Affidavits of Mary Anderson and Theresa 
Clemente).  The Indiana Department of Health is legally required to charge ten dollars to 
conduct a birth-certificate search.  Id. (citing IND. CODE §§ 16-37-1-11; 16-37-1-11.5 (2006)).  
The cost of such searches at local health departments ranges between two and ten dollars.  
Id.  For individuals born in other states, the cost for obtaining a birth certificate can be 
much more expensive and take even more time.  Id. 
57 Indiana BMV Expects Fewer Voter Problems, EVANSVILLE COURIER PRESS, Oct. 10, 2006, at 
B7. 
58 Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 775.  The plaintiffs’ federal constitutional claims included 
arguments that the law substantially burdened the fundamental right to vote, 
impermissibly discriminated between different classes of voters, disproportionately 
affected disadvantaged voters, was unconstitutionally vague, imposed a new and material 
requirement for voting, and was not justified by existing circumstances or evidence.  Id. at 
783-84.  The court criticized the plaintiffs for utilizing a “haphazard, ‘shot gun’ approach” 
in raising these issues and faulted the plaintiffs for not substantiating their claims with 
actual proof of harm or legal precedent.  Id. at 784 n.6. 
59 See generally id. at 784-809. 
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potential for the photo ID requirement to disenfranchise Indiana voters.60  
The court additionally noted, however, evidence of in-person fraud in 
other states exposes a direct correlation between the perception of fraud 
and voter confidence in the election system.61   
Significant in the court’s review of the record, however, was 
criticism of the lack of reliable evidence submitted to prove voter 
disenfranchisement.62  In particular, the court faulted the plaintiffs for 
not submitting affidavits of individual voters who lacked a government-
issued photo ID and who would be prevented or discouraged from 
voting as a result of the law.63  Similarly, the Rokita court entirely 
dismissed a report, submitted by the plaintiffs to estimate the number of 
Indiana voters without a photo ID, as “utterly incredible and unreliable,” 
effectively eliminating all of the evidentiary support for the plaintiffs’ 
claim of voter disenfranchisement.64  The Rokita court’s conclusions 
                                                 
60 The court noted that both parties stipulated that there was no evidence of in-person 
voter fraud in Indiana.  Id. at 792-93.  The court also acknowledged expert conclusions that 
Indiana’s voter ID law would negatively impact voters from lower socio-economic 
backgrounds, particularly the homeless, senior citizens, people with disabilities, the poor, 
and minorities.  Id. at 795 (citing conclusions of the Hershey Report). 
61 Id. at 793-94.  The court rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to exclude this evidence by 
claiming that the data was unsworn, unauthenticated, contained hearsay, and was not 
relied on by the Indiana legislature in passing the statute.  Id. at 843-44.  The Rokita court’s 
argument that the state did not have to empirically justify its purpose seems influenced by 
the court’s decision to use rational basis review, highly deferential to legislative judgments.  
Id.  The Rokita court expressed that a court should defer to legislative judgments, balancing 
prevention of voter fraud versus encouragement of voter turnout, unless such judgments 
are “grossly awry.”  Id. at 825.  In contrast, the Weinschenk court, analyzing Missouri’s voter 
ID statute under strict scrutiny, held that empirical justifications were necessary and that 
mere perception of fraud was insufficient justification for enacting a law which impacted a 
fundamental right.  Weinschenk v. Mo., 203 S.W.3d 201, 218 (Mo. 2006). 
62 Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 822-24. 
63 Id. at 819 (dismissing the “Organizational Plaintiffs” on standing grounds).  The court 
stated, that “[t]he only information provided to the court are the unsubstantiated hearsay 
statements alleging that unnamed individuals will be burdened by SEA 483; such 
statements are totally lacking in fending off summary judgment.”  Id.  Specifically, the 
court faulted the plaintiffs for “fail[ing] to produce any evidence of any individual, 
registered or unregistered, who would have to obtain photo identification in order to 
vote. . . .”  Id. at 822-23; see also Crawford v. Marion County Elec. Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 
2007) (affirming the Rokita decision for the same reason). 
64 Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 803.  The Brace Report was a statistical report which 
estimated the extent of potential voter disenfranchisement caused by Indiana’s voter ID 
law.  See generally id. at 803-09.  It was created by comparing the number of registered 
voters on the state voter roll with the number of residents with a state-issued ID, as 
indicated by state licensing records.  Id.  The court held that this report carried no 
evidentiary weight given its failure to comport with the standards propounded in the Rule 
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Id. at 803.  In particular, the Rokita court faulted the 
Brace Report for (1) failing to account for voter roll inflation, (2) comparing demographic 
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regarding the lack of evidence submitted to prove voter 
disenfranchisement was influential in the court’s subsequent legal 
analysis.65   
Because of the claimed evidentiary inadequacies, the Rokita court 
quickly determined that the harm imposed by Indiana’s voter ID law 
was not severe and did not warrant traditional strict scrutiny review.66  
Proceeding under the Burdick test and using rational basis review, the 
court concluded that the requirements of Indiana’s voter ID law were 
reasonable to advance the state’s important regulatory interest in 
preventing voter fraud.67  Defending its position, the Rokita court held 
that the state did not have to show actual proof of in-person fraud to 
justify its voter ID law and could rely instead on evidence of voter fraud 
in other states and the impact of perception of voter fraud in Indiana.68   
Next, considering the claim that Indiana’s voter ID statute 
constituted a poll tax, the Rokita court quickly concluded that the law did 
not impose any impermissible costs on the right to vote.69  The court 
noted that the Indiana statute required that the IDs be issued without 
                                                                                                             
data from different years without qualification or analysis, (3) drawing inaccurate and 
illogical conclusions, and (4) failing to qualify the statistical estimates based on 
socioeconomic data.  See generally id. at 803-07.  The Rokita court’s outright rejection of the 
Brace Report is somewhat confusing however, given the court’s subsequent use of 
statistical conclusions in the Brace Report to indirectly support the defendants’ counter-
arguments.  See, eg., id. at 806-07 (citing Brace Report statistics suggesting that 99% of 
Indiana voters already have a photo ID). 
65 See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.  Given the court’s repeated contention 
regarding the lack of evidence proving actual harm, it is somewhat confusing why the 
court proceeds to decide the claims on the merits rather than dismissing the claims for lack 
of standing.  Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 825 n.75.  Instead, it is often difficult to assess the 
Rokita court’s conclusions, given the court’s preference to dismiss claims as unsubstantiated 
without articulating more substantive legal analysis.  Id. at 819. 
66 Id. at 820.  Specifically, the court claimed that the plaintiffs had not presented 
individual affidavits or statistical evidence of voters who will be severely or 
disproportionately burdened by the law.  Id. at 822-24. 
[I]t is a testament to the law’s minimal burden and narrow crafting 
that Plaintiffs have been unable to uncover anyone who can attest to 
the fact that he/she will be prevented from voting . . . Lacking any 
such individuals who claim they will be prevented from voting, we are 
hard pressed to rule that SEA 483 imposes a severe burden on the right 
to vote. 
Id. at 823. 
67 Id. at 826.  See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing rational basis-like 
review under the Burdick test). 
68 Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 826 (noting evidence of in-person voter fraud in other states). 
69 Id. at 827. 
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cost to registered voters lacking government-issued photo IDs.70  
Similarly, the court held that the law did not impose secondary costs on 
the right to vote.71  Specifically, the court held that most Indiana voters 
already had government-issued photo IDs, eliminating the chance that 
they would be forced to pay for a birth certificate to obtain a voter ID 
card.72  The Rokita court bolstered this conclusion by pointing again to 
the lack of affidavits of voters who actually incurred those costs.73  In the 
alternative, the court held that the fees for acquiring a birth certificate 
were set by the federal government and were out of the control of the 
states.74   
Having found the law to withstand all of the plaintiffs’ claims, the 
Rokita court held that Indiana’s voter ID statute was a reasonable time, 
place, and manner regulation, and granted the State’s motion for 
summary judgment.75  On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit affirmed the holding, making Indiana’s voter ID 
statute the first and only of its kind to survive constitutional judicial 
review.76   
                                                 
70 Id. at 827 n.80.  See also IND. CODE § 9-24-16-10 (2007). 
71 Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 827 (noting the transportation and monetary costs, necessary 
to obtain a birth certificate).  The court held that “the imposition of tangential burdens does 
not transform a regulation into a poll tax.”  Id. 
72 Id.  In making this conclusion, the court suspiciously relied on estimates taken from 
the formerly rejected Brace Report.  See supra note 68.  It seems that the Rokita court both 
“had its cake and ate it too,” in regards to its use of the plaintiffs’ primary evidence for 
supporting the claim of voter disenfranchisement. 
73 Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 827.  The Rokita court held that it was “purely speculative” 
that some voters would incur costs to obtain a birth certificate, given the lack of voter 
affidavits from those incurring such a cost.  Id. 
74 Id. at 827. 
75 Id. at 845.  The Rokita court also dismissed numerous other claims against the voter ID 
law, including federal and state Constitutional claims and statutory Civil Rights claims.  See 
generally id. at 828-43.  However, these claims are beyond the scope of this paper, which 
limits its analysis to federal Constitutional claims involving the First, Fourteenth, and 
Twenty Fourth Amendments. 
76 On January 4, 2007, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Rokita decision, without 
substantially changing the analysis of the district court.  Crawford v. Marion County Elec. 
Bd., 472 F.3d 949  (7th Cir. 2007).  In a short opinion, authored by J. Richard Posner, the 
court affirmed that, despite the potential for some voters to be disenfranchised by Indiana’s 
voter ID law, there were no affidavits submitted to attest to disenfranchisement.  Id. at 952.  
The court also affirmed that Indiana’s voter ID law did not impose a poll tax that the 
submitted statistical report was methodologically flawed and argued that the lack of 
proven voter fraud in Indiana was due to the difficulty detecting in-person fraud, rather 
than proof that it did not exist in the state.  Id. at 952-53. 
 Most remarkably about the decision is J. Posner’s anecdotal discussion on how to 
measure severe harm against the right to vote.  See id. at 951-54.  Posner, who is acclaimed 
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2. Georgia 
On August 26, 2005, Georgia became the second state to require a 
government-issued photo ID in order to vote in-person.77  Similar to 
Indiana’s law, passage of Georgia’s voter ID law created heated partisan 
controversy in the state legislature and was ultimately passed along 
strict party lines.78  In its original form, Georgia’s voter ID law was 
                                                                                                             
for his theory of “Law and Economics,” argued in Crawford that the “severe” harm should 
not be judged in the abstract terms of value of the right to vote to a few individuals (only a 
small percentage of Indiana voters lacked a government-issued ID) but should rather be 
judged in more objective and quantifiable terms.  Id. at 952-53.  To J. Posner it did not seem 
to matter that some Indiana voters would be disenfranchised by the law, so long as the 
number of those disenfranchised was small enough to offset the legislative purpose for 
enacting the law.  Id. at 954. 
 Although, the Crawford decision carries some controlling weight, this Note will rely 
primarily on the opinion of the district court for discussion and will make reference to the 
Crawford decision only as it is helpful for interpretation.  Because the appellate court 
affirmed on the same grounds as Rokita and did not substantially alter the court’s 
reasoning, this Note uses the Rokita opinion for analysis because the reasoning is more 
expansively articulated in the Rokita decision. 
77 GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-417 (2003) (amended 2006).  Prior to adoption of its voter ID 
law, Georgia permitted seventeen forms of identification to access the polls.  See David H. 
Harris, Jr., Georgia Photo ID Requirement: Proof Positive of the Need to Extend Section 5, 28 N.C. 
CENT. L.J. 172, 182 (2006) [hereinafter Proof Positive] (discussing previous acceptable forms 
of identification).  Similar to the Indiana law, Georgia’s voter ID statute permitted voters 
without ID to cast a provisional ballot, stipulated on their ability to show proper 
identification within forty-eight hours of the election.  See Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d 
1326, 1354 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (discussing the deposition of Georgia’s Secretary of State, Cathy 
Cox).  Election officials, the news media, and national legislators were quick to characterize 
the new law as one of the “strictest” in the country.  See Georgia’s New Poll Tax, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 12, 2005, at A20 [hereinafter Georgia’s New Poll Tax]; Ariel Hart, Georgia Voters May 
Soon Need Photo IDs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2006, at A15 [hereinafter Hart I]; Proof Positives, 
supra note 77, at 195. 
78 See Jim Tharpe, Photo ID Approval Brings Warning, Atlanta J.-Const., June 20, 2006, at 
B1 [hereinafter Warning] (stating the Republican and Democrats were “at war” over the ID 
requirement).  State Democrats vigorously criticized the proposed law as an effort by their 
Republican counterparts to suppress the votes of the poor, the elderly, and minorities; 
groups who have a history of supporting Democratic candidates.  See Brenda Goodman, 
Judge Blocks Requirement in Georgia for Voter ID, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2006, at A10; Jill Young 
Miller & Carlos Campos, Photo ID Hot Topic, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., July 19, 2006, at D6; 
Cynthia Tucker, Our Opinion, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 25, 2006, at C6 [hereinafter Our 
Opinion June 25, 2006]; and Warning, supra note 78.   State Republicans countered that the 
vast majority of Georgians supported a photo identification requirement and that the new 
requirement was reasonable.  See Georgia’s Voter ID, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2005 at 4; Warning, 
supra note 78.  Ultimately, the law was passed along strict partisan lines.  See Common Cause 
I, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1331 (N.D. Ga 2005) (noting approval of the Conference Committee 
Report along strict party lines).  In addition to creating partisan disagreement, the 
proposed voter ID law also provoked racial tension in the Georgia legislature, culminating 
in a walk-out by the majority of the State’s African American lawmakers.  See Associated 
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unique because it mandated a direct fee to obtain a voter ID card, raising 
concern among many legislators who saw the law as an effort to 
suppress voting.79  Another concern among lawmakers was the fact that 
Georgia’s photo ID requirement was limited to in-person voting despite 
a lack of evidence of in-person voting fraud in the state.80  Additionally 
suspect and seemingly in conflict with the proffered legislative purpose 
of preventing voter fraud, Georgia’s legislature simultaneously loosened 
restrictions on absentee voting, an area of voting where fraud had been 
proven.81  Some argued that this shift in legislative preference toward 
absentee ballots would have a disproportionate effect on many African 
American voters who preferred to vote in-person out of historical 
distrust of the electoral system.82 
Upon passage of Georgia’s voter ID law,83 the Secretary of State’s 
office issued a report indicating that 676,246 registered Georgia voters 
lacked government-issued photo identification.84  The report was 
                                                                                                             
Press, Lawsuit to be Filed Over New Voting Law in Georgia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2005, at A17; 
Hart I, supra note 77. 
79 See Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1338, 1339-40.  At the same time that Georgia 
adopted its voter ID requirement, the state legislature also doubled the minimum cost for a 
state-issued photo ID from $10 to $20 for a five year ID and authorized a $35 fee for a ten 
year photo ID card.  Id at 1337. 
80 Id. at 1333-34, 1366. 
81 See id. at 1332-35, 1352 (discussing the concerns of Georgia’s Secretary of State, 
articulated in depositions and memoranda sent to the governor and state legislature).  See 
also Our Opinion June 25, 2006, supra note 78; Lyle V. Harris, Our Opinion, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., July 2, 2006, at C8 [hereinafter Opinion July 2, 2006]; Hart I, supra note 77 (quoting  
Georgia’s Secretary of State’s as stating that the new law would “open the floodgates” to 
“rampant fraud in absentee voting”). 
82 See Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1353 (noting statistical data showing that, in 
Georgia, Caucasians vote absentee more often than African Americans).  Cf. Proof Positive, 
supra note 77, at 194  (discussing the preference of African Americans to vote in-person due 
to historical disenfranchisement). 
83 See generally Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).  At the time of its adoption, 
Georgia’s voter ID law remained subject to pre-clearance by the United States Justice 
Department.  On August 26, 2005, in a controversial decision, the Chief of the Voting 
Division overruled the objection of four Justice Department attorney’s and granted 
approval for the law.  See generally Proof Positive, supra note 77.  See also Criticism of Voting 
Law Was Overruled, KANSAS CITY STAR, Nov. 17, 2005, at A.; Dan Eggen, Civil Rights Focus 
Shift Roils Staff at Justice: Veterans Exit Division as Traditional Cases Decline, WASH. POST, Nov. 
13, 2005, at A1; Dan Eggen, Justice Plays Down Memo Critical of Ga. Voter ID Plan, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 18, 2005, at A3; NOW Transcript—Show 235, Sept, 1, 2006, available at, 
http://www.pbs.org/now/transcript/235.html; William R. Yeomans, An Uncivil Division: 
Political Appointees to the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division are Driving Career Lawyers 
to Retirement—Then Skipping the Retirement Parties, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2005, at 20. 
84 Associated Press, More than 675,000 Georgia Voters Lack Photo ID, MACON TELEGRAPH, 
June 19, 2006, at C.  Despite such high numbers of Georgia voters without the requisite 
photo IDs, the state legislature did not provide funding or plan public education efforts to 
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criticized as “deceptive” by proponents of the law.  However, the 
potential disenfranchisement of such a large number of Georgia voters 
created concern, particularly because the majority of those without photo 
IDs were among politically vulnerable classes; namely minority, 
indigent, and rural voters.85   
a. Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups (“Common Cause I”) 
In the fall of 2005, Georgia’s voter ID law met its first of several legal 
challenges, facing claims that the law imposed an undue burden on the 
right to vote and created an unconstitutional poll tax.  This case raised 
nearly identical claims to those brought against Indiana’s voter ID law in 
Rokita.86  Extensively, considering the factual background of the law, the 
Common Cause I court noted the lack of in-person fraud in the state as 
well as the failure of the new law to address proven fraud in absentee 
voting and voter registration.87  Particularly influential in this regard 
                                                                                                             
inform registered voters of the law’s new requirements.  See Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 
2d at 1332.  But see Shannon McCaffrey, Georgia Voters Must Have Photo IDs: The U.S. 
Department of Justice Cleared the Law Wednesday, and the Elections Board Decided to Require IDs 
for the July 18 Primary, INTELLIGENCER, June 30, 2006, at A10.  Relying primarily on the 
education efforts of non-profit organizations, the state proposed only minimal education 
outreach to voters.  See Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1332.  However, the state did 
provide for limited voter-outreach to voters unable to access a DDS office.  Id. at 1338-39.  
At the time of the law’s passage, Georgia had only 58 DDS  centers for all of the state’s 159 
counties.  Id. at 1338.  Such a disparate spread of service centers can result in long drives, 
particularly for rural voters.  Id.  See also Georgia’s New Poll Tax, supra note 77 (decrying the 
law’s burden on rural voters). 
85 See Georgia Republican Party: Common Sense Ignored by Another Fulton County Judge, US 
FED. NEWS, July 7, 2006 (quoting Republican criticism of the Common Cause I decision); see 
also Georgia’s New Poll Tax, supra note 77 (discussing impact on the poor); Hart I, supra note 
77 (discussing concerns of the AARP, the ACLU, and the League of Women Voters and the 
impact of the new law on rural voters); Our Opinion July 2, 2006, supra note 81 (expressing 
concerns raised by the report and citing racial demographics of those without photo ID 
from the Secretary of State’s report). 
86 Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1354.  The plaintiffs raised numerous statutory 
Civil Rights claims as well.  Id. at 1370-75.  However, these claims are beyond the scope of 
this paper and were not determinative in the outcome of the case.   Id.  Further, and more 
important to the ultimate outcome of Georgia’s voter ID law, the plaintiffs also claimed that 
Georgia’s photo ID requirement violated the Georgia state constitution by improperly 
creating a non-enumerated  prerequisite to voting. Id. at 1357.  The Common Cause I court 
dismissed the state claim as well, noting that the Eleventh Amendment barred the court 
from review.  Id. at 1357-58.  However, on Sept. 9, 2006, a Georgia state court ultimately 
held that the photo ID requirement violated the state constitution and permanently 
enjoined the law, mooting the unresolved federal claims.  See Lake v. Perdue, 
2006CV119207 (Sup. Ct. Fulton County Sept. 19, 2006), available at 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/StateInjunction.pdf 
87 The court noted the legislative history of the new law, taking in the partisan passage 
of the bill, the fee increase for all government-issued IDs, and the simultaneous loosening 
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were the depositions of Georgia’s Secretary of State, Cathy Cox, who 
argued that the simultaneous legislative changes to in-person and 
absentee voting regulations were both unnecessary and “opened a 
gaping opportunity for fraud.”88  Additionally, in sharp and 
determinative contrast to the Rokita case, the Common Cause I court noted 
hundreds of affidavits of would-be voters affected by the law, lending 
support to the plaintiffs’ claim of voter disenfranchisement.89 
Although Georgia was not the first state to enact a strict voter ID 
requirement, Georgia’s voter ID law was the first to be tested in federal 
court.90  Given the uncertainty of how to analyze the new form of voting 
regulation, Common Cause I prudently chose to analyze the Equal 
Protection claim under both traditional strict scrutiny and the Burdick 
test.91  Under traditional strict scrutiny analysis, the court quickly 
determined that Georgia’s voter ID law was not narrowly tailored to the 
legislature’s stated interest in preventing fraud.92  Specifically, the court 
reasoned that by making the law exclusively applicable to in-person 
voting while simultaneously loosening the requirements for absentee 
voting, the state “left the field wide open for voter fraud by absentee 
voting.”93   
                                                                                                             
of restrictions on absentee voting.  Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1331-38.  The court 
also made note of the procedures for obtaining a photo ID, including the cost of obtaining a 
birth certificate and the process for completing a poverty affidavit.  Id. at 1338-40.  
Additionally, the court considered the testimony of Secretary of State Cathy Cox who 
explained that she had not received a single report of in-person voter fraud during her 
tenure.  Id. at 1350. 
88 Id. at 1351.  See also id. at 1332-35, 1361-62.  Secretary of State Cox said that she had not 
received a single report of in-person fraud during her nine-year tenure.  Id. at 1350. 
89 Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1340-42; Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups 
(“Common Cause II”), 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1312-13 (N.D. Ga 2006).  Alleged difficulties 
included: (1) voters lacking a car; (2) voters lacking a drivers license or alternative form of 
government-issued voter ID; (3) voters with mental of physical difficulties; (4) voters 
lacking access to public transportation; (5) voters who lived far from their respective 
registrar’s office; (6) voters who distrusted absentee voting; and (7) voters having difficulty 
accessing the voter outreach van.  Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1340-42. 
90 Rokita was decided six months after the Common Cause I decision.  See supra note 58. 
91 The Common Cause I court characterized the right to vote as fundamental and 
preservative of other rights, subject only to regulations which do not “unduly burden” the 
right.  Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1359.  See supra notes 25-38 and accompanying 
text (describing Equal Protection Analysis under the two tests). 
92 Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1361. 
93 Id. at 1362.  In doing so, the court also dismissed the defendants’ argument that the 
legislature was permitted to enact under-inclusive laws when attempting to remedy voter 
fraud, holding instead that the state must “narrowly tailor” legislation which burdens a 
fundamental right.  Id. at 1361.  Further, the court argued that the legislature “may not 
choose the way of greater interference” but must instead “choose [the] less drastic means” 
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Similarly, the court in Common Cause I concluded that Georgia’s 
voter ID law would likely fail the Burdick test as well.94  First, the court 
concluded that the “character and magnitude” of the asserted injury was 
significant, given the likely disproportionate effect on voters from 
vulnerable classes to whom the right to vote is of particularly high 
value.95  Similarly, because the law made the exercise of the right to vote 
extremely difficult, the court held that a strict scrutiny-like analysis 
should be used under the Burdick test.96  This is in stark contrast to the 
Rokita decision, which did not characterize the harm as severe, but 
instead denied any disenfranchisement due to a lack of evidentiary 
support.97   
Pursuant to its analysis under the Burdick test, the Common Cause I 
court held that the state’s interest in preventing voter fraud was 
important, but reasoned that the law’s photo ID requirement did not 
rationally serve that interest.98  Specifically, the court held that the law’s 
photo ID requirement did “absolutely nothing to preclude or reduce the 
possibility for the particular types of voting fraud that are indicated by 
the evidence . . . .”99  Noting again the lack of evidence of in-person voter 
fraud in the state and the simultaneous removal of absentee voting 
                                                                                                             
to accomplish its purposes, particularly when the legislature has numerous “less 
burdensome alternatives available.”  Id at 1362.  Specifically, the court pointed to the 
effective use of previous identification requirements and criminal sanctions to prevent in-
person voter fraud.   Id. 
94 Id. at 1362. 
95 Id.  The law’s potential disproportionate effect on voters from socially vulnerable 
classes was influential in the court’s characterization of the injury as significant.  Id. at 1365-
66.  See also supra note 8. 
96 Common Cause, I 405 F. Supp. 2d at 1362, 1365.  In concluding that the harm was 
“severe,” the Common Cause I court noted the difficulty accessing state DDS offices and 
held that the voter outreach van was not a feasible alternative for those who lacked 
transportation.  Id. at 1365.  Similarly, the court held that the availability of free ID cards 
through a poverty affidavit and the option of voting absentee were not reasonable 
alternatives to standard in-person voting procedures, given that the alternatives were not 
sufficiently publicized and were potentially stigmatizing.  Id. at 1363-65.  Additionally, the 
court concluded that the ability to vote by provisional ballot was illusory, given the short 
forty-eight hour time period allotted to return with a valid voter ID.  Id. at 1365. 
97 Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 824-25 (S.D. Ind. 2006).  See 
also supra note 76 and accompanying text (expounding on J. Posner’s unique argument in 
Crawford  regarding how severe harm should be determined).  Judge Richard Posner 
preferred to use objective and quantifiable evidence of disenfranchisement instead of 
estimating  severe harm in terms of the abstract value to voting to a relatively few number 
of individuals.  Id. 
98 Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1366. 
99 Id. 
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restrictions, the court argued that Georgia’s voter ID law would have the 
likely effect of increasing, not decreasing, fraud.100   
Finally, in addition to concluding that Georgia’s voter ID statute 
likely created an undue burden on the right to vote, Common Cause I also 
held that the law likely imposed an unconstitutional poll tax.101  
Specifically, the court faulted the suspect twenty dollar “fee” for a voter 
ID card, characterizing it as a material requirement on the right to 
vote.102  In addition, the court argued the poverty affidavit exception, 
which allowed poor voters to obtain free ID cards in exchange for legal 
affirmation of indigence, imposed a material requirement which would 
have a chilling effect on voting.103  This is in contrast to Rokita which 
upheld a similar provision in the Indiana voter ID law as an adequate 
safeguard for preventing disenfranchisement.104  Holding completely 
opposite to Rokita on both claims of undue burden and poll tax, the 
Common Cause I court held that Georgia’s voter ID law was likely 
unconstitutional and granted a preliminary injunction against the law.105   
b. Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups (“Common Cause II”) 
In January of 2006, the Georgia legislature quickly replaced the 
enjoined version of the 2005 statute with a nearly identical law, absent 
                                                 
100 Id. (“In short, HB 244 opened the door wide to fraudulent voting via absentee 
ballots.”). 
101 Id.  The Twenty-Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution bars the imposition of a 
monetary fee on the right to vote. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.  See also supra notes 39-45 
(discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding unconstitutional poll tax 
requirements). 
102 Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1366, 1370.  The court argued that the state’s 
attempt to characterize the twenty dollar cost as an administrative “fee” did not change it 
from being a tax on the right to vote.  Id. at 1366-67, 1369.  Additionally, the court was 
concerned that few voters would utilize a poverty affidavit, out of fear of perjury, 
embarrassment, or simply because they were unaware of the exception.  Id. at 1369-70.  The 
court noted that many voters lacking a government-issued ID did not believe themselves to 
be indigent but did not have $20 to spend on a voter ID.  Id. at 1340. 
103 Id. at 1369-70.  Even though the Georgia DDS claimed that they had a “no questions 
asked” policy regarding the affidavits, the Common Cause I court held that the policy was 
not publicized and was contrary to the stated purpose of the affidavit.  Id.  The court also 
noted that many voters lacking government-issued ID did not believe themselves to be 
indigent but did not have the $20 to spend on a voter ID.  Id. at 1340. 
104 Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 823 n.70, 824 n.73, 829 (S.D. 
Ind. 2006). 
105 Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1376 (stating “[i]n reaching this conclusion, the 
Court observes that it has great respect for the Georgia legislature.  The Court, however, 
simply has more respect for the Constitution.”). 
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the fee and poverty affidavit requirements.106  A month later, the 
plaintiffs from the original Common Cause I suit sought another 
injunction, asserting that the revised law was invalid on the same claims 
as before.107  With the opportunity to review Georgia’s voter ID law a 
second time and the Rokita decision for guidance on how to approach the 
analysis, the Common Cause II court relied exclusively on the Burdick test 
for analysis of the revised law.108   
While mimicking Rokita’s framework for analysis, the Common Cause 
II court diverged in its primary choice of analysis.  The court relied solely 
on the Burdick test and held that Georgia’s voter ID law imposed severe 
harm on the right to vote given the law’s potential to disenfranchise 
thousands of Georgia voters due to insufficient time to acquire 
comporting ID before the approaching primary elections.109  Influential 
in its conclusion, the Common Cause II court relied on a statistical 
estimate of potential disenfranchisement created by Georgia’s Secretary 
of State’s office, which indicated that nearly 700,000 Georgia voters 
lacked a valid government-issued photo ID.110  The Common Cause II 
court’s adoption of this statistical evidence is in stark contrast to the 
Rokita court’s rejection of a similar report and its subsequent holding that 
the harm imposed by Indiana’s voter ID law was not severe given the 
lack of evidence of voter disenfranchisement.111  Proceeding under a 
strict scrutiny-like analysis and using similar language to the previous 
Common Cause I suit, the Common Cause II court reasoned that Georgia’s 
voter ID law did not address known types of voter fraud in the state and 
was therefore not narrowly tailored.112   
However, the Common Cause II court rejected the claim that 
secondary costs, incidental to acquiring identifying documents for an ID 
                                                 
106 GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-417 (2003) (amended 2006); see also Common Cause/Georgia v. 
Billups (“Common Cause II”), 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1304-05 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (noting the 
partisan passage of both versions of Georgia’s voter ID law). 
107 Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1297. 
108 See generally id. at 1345-52. 
109 Id. at 1346-49.  The court also held that the law’s exceptions were unrealistic 
alternatives to in-person voting.  Id.  Specifically, the court held that the exceptions of 
absentee voting and voting by provisional ballot were insufficiently publicized, too 
difficult for some voters, and made unrealistic demands upon some voters.  Id. 
110 Id. at 1311.  The court also pointed out that the majority of those potentially 
disenfranchised were elderly, infirm, indigent, or from a racial minority.  Id. at 1304, 1311.  
Additionally, the court repeated its prior assertion that that the loss of the right to vote to 
vulnerable classes is “undeniably demoralizing and extreme, as those citizens are likely to 
have no other realistic or effective means of protecting their rights.”  Id. at 1350. 
111 See Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 823-24 (S.D. Ind. 2006). 
112   Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1346-50. 
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card, constituted a poll tax.113  Drawing on language directly from the 
Rokita decision, the Common Cause II court reasoned that tangential 
burdens on the right to vote were permitted and argued that incidental 
costs to obtain birth certificates were “speculative.”114  Specifically, birth 
certificates and other certified government documents were not 
exclusively mandated to obtain a voter ID under Georgia’s statute.115  
Thus, the Common Cause II court held that the revised law likely did not 
impose an invalid poll tax.116 
c.  Lake v. Perdue 
On September 19, 2006, a Georgia state court permanently enjoined 
Georgia’s voter ID law, holding that the state legislature exceeded its 
authority under the Georgia constitution by impermissibly adding a 
non-enumerated ground for denying the right to vote.117  Although this 
case is not helpful for analyzing federal Equal Protection claims, it is 
useful for demonstrating that, in addition to exceeding the general 
regulatory power of the states under the federal constitution, state voter 
ID laws can also improperly exceed the more narrowly defined 
regulatory authority of state legislatures under state constitutions.118  
                                                 
113 Id. at 1355.  The Common Cause II court commended the state legislature for amending 
the statute to issue voter ID cards without cost to all voters who lacked a government-
issued photo ID.  Id. at 1354.  The alternative outcome in Common Cause II suggests that the 
court felt the Georgia legislature had sufficiently amended the law by eliminating the fee 
and poverty affidavit requirements. 
114 Id. at 1355 (citing Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 827). 
115 Id.  The Georgia voter ID statute uniquely allows utility bills, employment-issued 
photo IDs, and voter registration cards to prove identity for purposes of obtaining a voter 
ID.  See GA. CODE ANN.  § 21-2-417.1 (2006). 
116 Common Cause II, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1355. 
117 Lake v. Perdue, 2006CV119207 (Sup. Ct. Fulton County Sept. 19, 2006), available at 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/StateInjunction.pdf.  
Specifically, the court held that the provisional ballot requirement of the law, requiring 
voters without a photo ID to produce the requisite voter ID card within forty-eight hours of 
voting in order to have their vote counted, improperly added a non-constitutionally 
enumerated ground for denying the right to vote.  Id. at 13-14. 
118 Similar state constitutional claims were brought in federal court in Rokita and Common 
Cause I.  The Rokita court decided the claim on the merits, holding that the Indiana 
legislature did not exceed its constitutional authority in enacting the statute.  Indiana 
Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 843 (S.D. Ind. 2006).  Instead, the Rokita 
court reasoned that the state legislature had exclusive authority to enact reasonable time, 
place, and manner restrictions on the right to vote.  Id.  In contrast, the Common Cause I 
court held that it did not have jurisdiction to decide the claim because of conflicts with state 
and federal law, giving rise to the separate suit in Lake.  Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups 
(“Common Cause I”), 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1358 (N.D. Ga. 2005). 
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Additionally, the Lake decision is important because it effectively mooted 
the federal Equal Protection claim against the previously enjoined law.119  
3. Missouri 
On June 14, 2006, Missouri became the third state to require a 
government-issued photo ID in order to vote in-person.120  Similar to 
other voter ID laws, Missouri’s statute passed quickly along strict 
partisan lines.121  At the time of its passage, an estimated 170,000 
registered Missouri voters, primarily seniors, the disabled, and the poor, 
lacked a government-issued photo ID.122  Similar to Georgia, Missouri’s 
Secretary of State, Robin Carnahan, expressed concern regarding the 
law’s potential to disenfranchise and vowed to educate voters about the 
                                                 
119 Lake, 2006CV11920 at 15.  The day after Fulton County Superior Court enjoined 
Georgia’s voter ID law, the state Election Board mailed 79,496 letters to registered Georgia 
voters without driver’s licenses, informing them where they could obtain a free voter ID.  
Ernie Suggs, State Backtracks on Voter ID Alert, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 18, 2006, at A1 
[hereinafter Backtracks].  Five days later, the state Board mailed an additional 115,747 
letters.   Id.  Some claimed that the letters were intentionally sent by the Republican-
controlled election Board to confuse voters about the law’s requirements.  See Vicky 
Eckenrode, Voters Will Get Letters on IDs, THE AUGUSTA CHRON., Oct. 18, 2006, at B5.  
Members of the U.S. Congress, concerned by the suspicious mailings, requested a federal 
investigation.  Lewis, Two Senators Request Voter ID Letter Investigation, MACON TELEGRAPH, 
Oct. 22, 2006, at F.  Likewise, on Oct. 16, 2006, former Governor Roy Barnes filed a civil 
contempt suit against the Board.  Ernie Suggs, Barnes Says Letters End his Voter ID Lawsuit, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 19, 2006, at D7 [hereinafter Barnes Says].  The following day, the 
Board decided to mail new letters, emphasizing that voter IDs were not required to vote, 
and decided to issue public service announcements declaring the same.  Voter ID Letter: 
New Mailings Set to Clarify the Rules, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 22, 2006, at E4.  Mailing the 
new letters cost the state an additional $127,000.  See Backtracks supra.  As a result of the 
Board’s remedial actions, Governor Barnes dropped his suit, but some argued that a federal 
investigation was still necessary.  See Barnes Says supra. 
120 MO. ANN. STAT. § 115.427 (West 2003 & Supp. 2006).  The Missouri law mandated that 
the IDs be issued free of charge and uniquely permitted voters to cast a provisional ballot 
without a voter ID until 2008, to allow voters time to comply with the new requirement.  
See Virginia Young, State Starts Issuing Voter IDs, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 15, 2006, at 
A1 [hereinafter State Starts]. 
121 See Steve Walsh, Senate Cuts Off Debate and Approves Photo ID Voting Bill, May 12, 2006, 
available at www.missourinet.com. 
122 See Weinschenk v. Mo., 203 S.W.3d 201, 212-13 (Mo. 2006) (citing estimates between 
169,215 and 240,000 voters).  See also State Starts, supra note 120 (citing the number of 
Missouri voters without IDs and discussing the difficulty for persons with disabilities to 
obtain a voter ID); Missouri Secretary of State Carnahan Issues Statement on Photo ID Bill 
Signing, US STATE NEWS, June 14, 2006 [hereinafter Statement] (quoting Secretary 
Carnahan’s concerns about the new law).  But see Letters from Readers, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, July 24, 2006, at B8 (state Senator Delbert Scott, proponent of the new legislation, 
explains the law’s exception for senior citizens and touts the Department of Revenue’s 
proposed outreach to nursing homes). 
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new ID requirement before the 2006 midterm elections.123  In particular, 
Secretary Carnahan and others feared that the new law would have a 
disproportionate impact on indigent, disabled, and elderly voters, a 
concern common to every state voter ID law thus far enacted.124  To 
combat this concern, the Missouri Department of Revenue hired 
temporary employees to provide outreach to the elderly and disabled by 
contacting senior living facilities and sheltered workshops and 
dispatching mobile outreach vans to process voter ID applications.125  
Similar outreach was not provided for indigent voters.126  
                                                 
123 See Statement, supra note 122.  Secretary of State Carnahan began a public awareness 
initiative, “Show Your Face at the Polls,” to inform the general public about the 
requirements of the new law, including a mass-mailing, public service announcements, a 
toll-free help line, and a four-city tour across Missouri.  See Secretary of State Carnahan 
Launches Photo ID Awareness Campaign, U.S. STATE NEWS, July 21, 2006; Carnahan Promotes 
Voter ID Law, ST. LOUIS BUS. J., July 25, 2006; Senate 2006 Missouri: Identification Problems, 
AM. POL. NETWORK, July 26, 2006 [hereinafter Problems].  While expressing her eager intent 
to vigilantly provide outreach to voters, Secretary Carnahan expressed frustration that the 
legislature did not budget any money to finance voter outreach.  See Statement, supra note 
122; State Starts, supra note 120. 
 Department of Revenue offices are prevalent in Missouri, each equipped to distribute 
IDs.  Letters from Readers, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 1, 2006, at B6 (editorial submitted 
by the Missouri Department of Revenue, emphasizing the numerous offices located across 
the state, including nineteen within the city of St. Louis).  However, as a result of the lack of 
voter outreach, it is not surprising that Missouri voters did not quickly “catch on” to the 
new ID requirement.  During the first month that the law was in effect, only 629 of the 
170,000 registered Missouri voters without a government-issued photo ID obtained a voter 
ID.  See Problems supra; Revenue Department Continues Proactive Push to Distribute Photo IDs in 
Advance of November Election, U.S. STATE NEWS, July 21, 2006. 
124 See State Starts, supra note 120.  Most significantly, concern was raised regarding the 
financial and time costs incidental to obtaining a birth certificate, a mandatory prerequisite 
to achieve a voter identification card.  Id.  For example, the Department of Health and 
Senior Services encouraged voters to allow two weeks to process requests for birth 
certificates and up to six months if the documents need correction due to misspelling or 
name changes.  Id.  But see Problems, supra note 123 (Missouri Governor Blunt discounted 
the law’s financial effect on low-income voters).  Documentary costs and other incidental 
costs, such as the costs of time and transportation needed to obtain a voter ID, were not 
provided for by the state.  See State Starts, supra note 120 (quoting Missouri Governor Blunt, 
“We’re not going to reimburse people who are driving to fulfill a civic obligation. That’s an 
absurd suggestion.”). 
125 See Virginia Young, Lawsuit is Filed Against Voter ID Law, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
July 18, 2006, at B1. Since adoption of the state voter ID law, mobile outreach was chiefly 
initiated on an “as-needed” basis, determined through phone conversations with facility 
administrators for the elderly and disabled.  See Revenue Department Continues Proactive 
Push to Distribute Photo IDs in Advance of November Election, U.S. STATE NEWS, July 21, 2006.  
From these conversations, the Revenue Department concluded that about 25 percent of the 
facilities had “no need” for a visit.  Id.; see also Letters from Readers, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Aug. 1, 2006, at B6 (quoting the Director of the Missouri Department of 
Revenue, “[n]early 300 so far have told us there is no need.”).  With such a high number of 
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a. Weinschenk v. Missouri 
On October 16, 2006, the Missouri Supreme Court struck down the 
state’s voter ID law on state Equal Protection grounds.127  Reviewing the 
law exclusively under the rubric of federal Equal Protection analysis, the 
Weinschenk court seemingly combined what previous courts analyzed as 
distinct Equal Protection and poll tax claims.128  In contrast to the 
holdings of Rokita and Common Cause II, the Weinschenk court held that 
the incidental costs of time and money, necessary to obtain a voter ID, 
imposed direct costs on the right to vote and constituted “severe” harm 
against the fundamental right.129  
Unique in its analysis, the Weinschenk court astutely reasoned that 
the Federal REAL ID Act mandated the states to require proof of 
citizenship, exclusively through a birth certificate or U.S. passport, before 
issuing a photo ID.130  Due to the statutory overlap, the Weinschenk court 
reasoned that Missouri’s voter ID law indirectly forced some voters to 
pay documentary costs before obtaining a voter ID card; directly 
                                                                                                             
facility administrators rejecting voter outreach for their residents, it seems suspect how 
much input was actually submitted from the residents themselves. 
126 See Problems, supra note 123 (quoting Trish Vincent, Director of the Missouri 
Department of Revenue, “[t]he law is clear. We are to work with older folks, the seniors 
and the disabled, not the low-income.”). 
127 Weinschenk v. Mo., 203 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2006).  Although, the Weinschenk court’s 
holding was based on the strict requirements of Missouri’s state constitution, the court’s 
reasoning is useful as anecdotal analysis under the more general protections of the federal 
Equal Protection clause.  Id.  at 219.  For instance, although the Missouri state constitution 
provided greater protection of the right to vote than its federal counterpart, the Weinschenk 
court used strict scrutiny analysis to evaluate the severity of harm imposed by the Missouri 
voter ID law; a method of analysis common to both state and federal constitutions.  Id. at 
212, 215-16.  The only notable difference in the court’s analysis was the choice to use strict 
scrutiny outright rather than under the Burdick test, in an effort to comport with the “more 
protective” state constitution.  Id. at 212, 216.  Thus the Weinschenk court’s analysis is both 
poignant and valuable for comparable Equal Protection challenges under the federal 
Constitution.  Id. 
128 Id. at 210-19. 
129 Id. at 213-14, 216.  Distinguishing the present case from the holdings of Rokita and 
Common Cause I, the Weinschenk court held that plaintiffs had proved through affidavits 
that actual voters would be forced to incur monetary costs before obtaining the requisite 
voter IDs.  Id. 
130 Id. at 207-08 (citing the REAL ID ACT, Pub. Law 109-13, Title II).  See also Weinschenk, 
203 S.W.3d at 208-09 (discussing secondary costs of time and money that are needed to 
obtain a voter ID).  The determination by the Weinschenk court that these secondary costs 
imposed direct costs on the right to vote is in sharp contrast to the Rokita decision, where 
the court held that characterizing such costs as a poll tax was a “dramatic overstatement of 
what fairly constitutes a ‘poll tax.’”  See Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 
775, 827 (S.D. Ind. 2005). 
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imposing a more than “de minimus cost” on the right to vote.131  
However, instead of characterizing these costs as a poll tax, the 
Weinschenk court considered the combined effect of secondary costs, the 
difficulty obtaining a voter ID, and the potential disenfranchisement of 
240,000 voters as jointly imposing a severe burden on the fundamental 
right to vote.132  In addition to documentary costs, the court found that 
the law imposed heavy practical costs, such as time and travel.133  
Given both the gravity of the harm and the more stringent 
protections of the Missouri state constitution, the Weinschenk court 
reasoned that the law must be reviewed outright under strict scrutiny 
and not under the more flexible Burdick test.134  While finding that 
Missouri’s interest in preventing fraud was compelling, the court held 
that Missouri’s voter ID law was neither necessary nor narrowly tailored 
to meet that interest.135  Thus, the court concluded that Missouri’s voter 
ID law violated the Equal Protection clause of the state constitution.136  
                                                 
131 Weinschenk, 203 S.W.3d at 213.  The court reasoned that the voter IDs are not free, so 
long as voters were required to spend money to acquire a birth certificates or passport to 
obtain a voter ID.  Id.  Additionally, the court noted that such costs would likely be forced 
upon those least able to bear them.  Id. at 214. 
For Missourians who live beneath the poverty line, the $15 they must 
pay in order to obtain their birth certificates and vote is $15 that they 
must subtract from their meager ability to feed, shelter, and clothe 
their families. The exercise of fundamental rights cannot be 
conditioned upon financial expense. 
Id. at 214. 
132 Id. at 212-16. 
133 The court noted that the waiting period to obtain a Missouri birth certificate can 
extend between six to eight weeks.  Id. at 208-09. 
134 Id. at 215-16. 
135 Id. at 217.  The court also concluded that the State’s proffered interest in combating 
perceived, but unproven, in-person voter fraud was insufficient to interfere with the 
fundamental right to vote.  Id. at 218. 
[I]f this Court were to approve the placement of severe restrictions on 
Missourians’ fundamental rights owing to the mere perception of a 
problem in this instance, then the tactic of shaping public 
misperception could be used in the future as a mechanism for further 
burdening the right to vote or other fundamental rights. 
Id. at 218. 
136 Id. at 219, 221-22.  Weighing heavily in the court’s analysis was the State’s concession 
that the law did not seek to prevent known fraud in absentee voting and voter registration, 
but rather attempted to eliminate in-person voter fraud, which was “not a problem in 
Missouri.”  Id. at 217.  Following Weinschenk, the Missouri Republican Party issued a press 
release calling it a “direct attack on free and fair elections by activist judges.”  See Scott 
Lauck, Missouri Republican Party Blames Voter ID Law Decision on the Court, MO. LAW. 
WEEKLY, Oct. 23, 2006. 
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C. Foreshadowing the Continued Development of Voter ID Law:  Purcell v. 
Gonzalez 
Indicating the urgency of the issues created by state voter ID laws 
and potentially foreshadowing future judicial review, the U.S Supreme 
Court intervened less than three weeks before the 2006 midterm state 
and federal elections in an Arizona federal case involving a 
constitutional challenge to Arizona’s voter ID law.137  Without 
commenting on the issues, the Court vacated a federal appellate court 
injunction against the law, holding that enforcing the injunction would 
likely create voter confusion so close to the upcoming elections.138   
Although the Court subsequently granted certiorari in September of 
2007, it is uncertain how the Supreme Court will ultimately rule on the 
issues presented by state voter ID laws and how narrowly it will 
construe its holding.139  Given the rising prevalence of state voter ID laws 
across the nation and the high political and sociological stakes 
accompanying them, however, it is certain that more legal challenges 
                                                 
137 Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 5 (2006).  This Note does not directly discuss Arizona’s 
voter ID law.  However, Purcell is influential because the requirements of Arizona’s statute 
and the issues raised are similar to those of voter ID laws in other states.  See ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN.  § 16-579A (2006).  See also Joyce Purnick, Parties Divided on Laws Requiring ID for 
Voters, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 27, 2006, at 1R (discussing the legislative history of the 
law’s enactment and concerns regarding disenfranchisement of the poor, the elderly, and 
Native Americans in the state). 
 As a testament to the Court’s rapid intervention, the Court vacated a federal court 
injunction against the law only one week after it had been ordered by the lower court.  See 
Purcell, 127 S. Ct at 7-8.  What is most interesting in the Court’s decision is Justice Steven’s 
concurring opinion, which suggested that allowing the midterm elections to proceed under 
the new law would have the added advantage of producing a factual record of alleged 
harms.  Id. at 8.  Such historical facts, he suggests, will assist courts evaluating 
Constitutional claims against state voter ID laws in the future.  Id.  However, neither Justice 
Stevens nor the U.S. Supreme Court indicated whether the Court would be utilizing such a 
record in the near future.  Id. 
138 Id. at 7.  Arizona voters had anticipated that the law would take effect ever since a 
2004 state-wide referendum enacting the law.  See David G. Savage, High Court Allows 
Arizona to Enact New Voter ID Law, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2006, at 12 (explaining that the law 
passed by 56% of the vote).  Further, the Supreme Court chided the Court of Appeals for 
giving insufficient deference to the factual findings of the District court and for 
insufficiently justifying its decision.  See Purcell, 127 S. Ct. at 7. 
139 See supra note 137.  In the Purcell opinion, the court did not indicate whether it would 
soon take up the issue itself.  However, on September 25, 2007, the Court granted certiorari 
in Indiana Dem. Party v. Rokita.  See 2007 WL 1999963 (2007); 2007 WL 1999941.  See infra 
notes 300-12 for further discussion regarding the pending Supreme Court appeal. 
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will be brought in the future.140  Additionally, as a result of the diverse 
outcomes and reasoning in the cases thus far decided, it is likely that the 
case law regarding voter ID statutes will continue to develop differently 
across separate jurisdictions.141  As courts continue to grapple with this 
rapidly developing area of law, it may serve useful for future litigators 
and legal scholars to understand what makes some claims more 
successful than others.142  Focusing exclusively on Equal Protection and 
poll tax claims, this Note turns now to a more detailed analysis of the 
initial case law in search of such trends.143   
III.  ANALYSIS 
Having considered the similar creation and divergent judicial 
treatment of three voter ID laws, this Note will now attempt to reconcile 
these initial cases in order to determine why some constitutional claims 
have been more successful than others.144  In doing so, Part III serves as a 
detailed analysis, comparing and contrasting current judicial 
reasoning.145  In addition, Part III provides some commentary to clarify 
and critique judicial reasoning that was insufficiently developed or 
supported.146  Part III also examines how the law is presently developing 
in order to anticipate how it might continue to develop in the future.147  
Part III.A first considers Equal Protection claims which allege that state 
voter ID statutes unduly burden the right to vote.148  Part III.B considers 
poll tax claims against state voter ID laws.149  
A. Equal Protection–Voter ID Statutes Unduly Burden the Right to Vote 
Courts evaluating Equal Protection challenges to state voter ID laws 
have varied in the use of outright strict scrutiny and the Burdick test, 
                                                 
140 At the time of this writing, legal challenges and appeals were pending in Arizona, 
Michigan, New Mexico, and Ohio.  See Moritz College of Law, Ohio State University, Major 
Pending Election Law Litigation,  http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation. 
141 See id. 
142 See infra Part III (discussing the judicial outcomes of the earliest challenges against 
state voter ID laws). 
143 See infra Part III. 
144 See generally infra Part III. 
145 See generally infra Part III. 
146 See generally infra Part III. 
147 See generally infra Part IV (attempting to synthesize these insights into a blueprint for 
successful litigation against state voter ID laws in the future). 
148 See infra Part III.A. 
149 See infra Part III. 
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often providing little or no direct insight into their choice of analysis.150  
Regardless whether the court selects strict scrutiny analysis outright or 
as part of the Burdick test, it is the court’s decision to use the more 
stringent analysis subsequently under either approach that is often 
determinative of the ultimate success of the claim.151  Thus, it is 
important for those considering bringing claims against state voter ID 
laws to understand the factors which appear most influential in the 
courts’ determination to use strict scrutiny analysis.152  
1. A Uniform Standard for Analyzing State Voter ID Laws is Still 
Developing  
A likely reason for the lack of a uniform judicial approach for 
analyzing state voter ID laws is the sheer newness of the developing law, 
with different judges experimenting with alternative approaches.153  
However, more recent cases may indicate a potential shift in judicial 
preference towards exclusive reliance on the Burdick test.  For example, 
Common Cause I, the first court to decide an Equal Protection claim 
against a state voter ID law, prudently chose to analyze the law under 
both standards, given the lack of established case law.154  In Common 
Cause II, however, the court had the opportunity to re-analyze a nearly 
identical voter ID law but only evaluated the law under the Burdick 
test.155  Neither the evidence nor the claims substantially changed in the 
interim period between Common Cause suits.156  What did change during 
the interim period was the resolution of the Rokita case, analyzing 
Indiana’s voter ID law exclusively under the Burdick test and providing 
legal precedent for the Common Cause II court.157  Given the dramatic 
shift in the court’s choice of analysis, without any significant changes in 
the record, it can be reliably inferred that the Common Cause II court 
                                                 
150 See supra notes 66-68, 91-100, 108-12, 134-36 (citing judicial analysis and outcome in the 
initial legal challenges to state voter ID laws). 
151 See supra notes 66-68, 91-100, 108-12, 134-36 (citing judicial analysis and outcome in the 
initial legal challenges to state voter ID laws). 
152 See infra Part IV (citing importance of striking down stringent voter ID laws that will 
disproportionately disenfranchise vulnerable classes of voters). 
153 See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text (discussing the Common Cause court’s 
evolving choice of analysis in the subsequent suits). 
154 Common Cause/Georgia v. Burdick, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1361-66 (N.D. Ga. 2005) 
(Common Cause I). 
155 Id. at 1345-53. 
156 Indeed, the Common Cause II court also used nearly identical language in a substantial 
part of its opinion.  Compare Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1362-66, with Common 
Cause/Georgia v. Burdick, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1345-53 (N.D. Ga. 2006). 
157 See Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775 (S.D. Ind. 2006). 
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modeled its analysis after the Rokita decision, in an attempt to adopt a 
more uniform standard for analyzing state voter ID laws.158   
Another factor that may influence a court’s choice of analysis is how 
the particular court resolves the tension between the “conflicting 
constitutional principles” of the state’s authority to regulate elections 
and the constitutional protection of the fundamental right to vote.159  The 
subtle drafting differences in the courts’ legal standards, some courts 
strongly characterizing the right to vote as fundamental while others 
more expansively articulating the states’ authority to regulate elections, 
directly correlates with the standard of review adopted by each court.160   
For instance, both Common Cause courts and the Weinschenk court 
strongly emphasized the right to vote as fundamental but only briefly 
mentioned the state’s regulatory authority, making clear that provisions 
in state and federal constitutions limited the authority.161  All three 
courts acknowledged that the state had some regulatory authority over 
federal elections but tempered this with case law suggesting limitation 
on the state’s authority.162  Reflecting their similar depiction of the 
conflicting principles involved, all three courts also adopted strict 
scrutiny analysis and struck down the challenged voter ID laws as 
imposing a severe and undue burden on the right to vote.163   
In contrast, the Rokita court only cursorily acknowledged the right to 
vote as fundamental, yet quickly and more expansively emphasized that 
the right was not absolute and was subject to the state’s “broad” 
authority to “impose extensive restrictions on voting.”164  Similarly, the 
Rokita court only cursorily mentioned the limitations on the state’s power 
to regulate.165  Reflecting this characterization and diverging from the 
Common Cause and Weinschenk decisions in both choices of analysis and 
                                                 
158 See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text. 
159 Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 821. 
160 See infra notes 161-66 and accompanying text. 
161 The Common Cause courts emphasized both the fundamental nature and the extreme 
importance of the right to vote, underscoring that voting is essential to preserving other 
rights.  See Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1359; Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 
1343-44.  Similarly in Weinschenk, the court emphasized that the fundamental right to vote 
was protected against state regulatory authority by both the Federal Constitution and the 
more protective Missouri Constitution.  See Weinschenk v. Mo., 203 S.W.3d 201, 210-12 
(Mo. 2006). 
162 See supra note 130. 
163 See Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1350-51; Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 
1361-62, 1366; Weinschenk, 203 S.W.3d at 215-18. 
164 Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 820-21. 
165 Id. 
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outcome, the Rokita court proceeded under the Burdick test and rational 
basis review and concluded that Indiana’s voter ID law was a valid 
“time, place, and manner” restriction on the right to vote.166   
At first glance, the courts’ asymmetrical descriptions, subtly favoring 
either the constitutional protections of the fundamental right to vote or 
the power of the states to regulate elections, may not appear significantly 
influential in their choice of analysis.167  However, given the courts’ 
distinct characterizations of these “potentially conflicting constitutional 
principles” and the corresponding level of deference granted to the 
states’ enactment of voter ID laws, the courts’ subtle descriptions of the 
competing rights may actually represent more careful judicial drafting.  
Such careful drafting might reflect a preferred resolution to the tension 
created by state voter ID laws.168  
In sum, the choice of judicial standard for reviewing state voter ID 
laws is still developing.169  While it may be helpful to be able to predict 
which standard a court will likely use to review an Equal Protection 
claim, the court’s initial choice of standard is not always determinative of 
the outcome of the claim.170  This is especially true, given that a court 
may use strict scrutiny analysis under the Burdick test as well as outright, 
so long as the court determines the harm to the right to vote is severe.171  
What is important is not that the court adopts traditional strict scrutiny 
outright, but rather that the court ultimately decides to utilize strict 
scrutiny analysis if it chooses to review the challenged regulation under 
the Burdick test.172   
                                                 
166 Id. at 820-21, 823-26, 845. 
167 See supra notes 161-66 and accompanying text (discussing the correlation between the 
court’s drafting of legal standard and its subsequent choice of analysis). 
168 See supra note 159 and accompanying text (the Rokita court’s decision to discuss the 
“conflicting” constitutional principals suggests that the court was concerned with this 
tension and was attempting to resolve it through its choice of judicial analysis). 
169 At the time of this writing several legal challenges against state voter ID laws were 
pending, with new challenges being raised as frequently as the development of the laws.  
See supra note 140 and accompanying text (citing pending challenges). 
170 See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text (Common Cause II’s decision to 
exclusively rely on the Burdick test did not prevent that court from striking down Georgia’s 
revised voter ID statute). 
171 See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text (describing judicial analysis under the 
Burdick test). 
172 Id. 
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2. The Use of Strict Scrutiny Analysis is Justified by Evidence of 
“Severe” Harm  
The sufficiency and reliability of evidence used by the plaintiffs to 
show “severe” harm is largely determinative on a court’s decision to 
utilize strict scrutiny as part of its Equal Protection analysis.173  The types 
of evidence most influential in this determination of “severe” harm—
including affidavits of registered voters, prohibited or dissuaded from 
voting as a result of a voter ID law, and statistical reports—estimate the 
extent of potential disenfranchisement imposed by the law.174  
Additionally, determining the extent to which a voter ID law makes the 
exercise of the right to vote more difficult as a whole is also useful for 
proving “severe” harm to the right.175   
The use of affidavits is essential to show actual voters are affected by 
the law.176  Without these, a court may quickly determine that the harm 
is not severe and dismiss the claim under rational basis review.177  For 
example, in the Common Cause cases, hundreds of affidavits of voters 
adversely affected by Georgia’s voter ID law were submitted to show 
actual and “severe” harm.178  Similar affidavits were not submitted in 
Rokita, an omission that the court severely criticized at numerous points 
in its analysis.179  In fact, Rokita’s primary justification for holding that 
the harm was not severe and for rejecting nearly every claim brought 
against Indiana’s voter ID law was the plaintiffs’ apparent inability to 
identify a single voter affected by the law.180  Somewhat incredulously, 
but arguably justified on strict evidentiary grounds, the Rokita court 
reasoned that the plaintiffs’ failure to submit such affidavits was proof 
                                                 
173 Although this terminology sounds specific to analysis under the Burdick test, 
characterizing the harm as severe is also useful for judicial analysis under outright strict 
scrutiny as well.  See supra notes 32-38. 
174 See supra notes 62-65, 110-12 and accompanying text (discussing the different 
approaches of both the Rokita and Common Cause II courts towards such evidence). 
175 See infra note 193 and accompanying text.  Such difficulties include: the complexity of 
obtaining a voter ID, insufficient voter education, inadequate alternatives, and the 
disproportionate impact on poor, elderly, disabled, and minority voters. 
176 See infra notes 178-81 and accompanying text (discussing Rokita’s criticism of the lack 
of this type of evidence submitted to prove actual harm). 
177 Id. 
178 See supra note 89. 
179 Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 784 n.6, 822-23 (S.D. Ind. 
2006); see also supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. 
180 Rakita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 822-23. 
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that the law was both narrowly tailored and equipped with sufficient 
safeguards to avoid disenfranchising voters.181   
Similarly, the use of statistical reports to estimate the scope of voter 
disenfranchisement is essential for establishing the alleged harm as 
severe and for justifying the utilization of strict scrutiny analysis.182  
Influential factors in the courts’ reliance on such reports as evidencing 
“severe” harm are the scientific integrity of the reports and the source 
and purpose of creating the report.183  For example, in Common Cause II, 
the plaintiffs submitted a report created by the Georgia Secretary of 
State’s Office drafted pursuant to the state legislature’s consideration of 
the proposed voter ID law.184  The report, made from statistical 
comparisons of voter registration lists and DDS licensing information, 
estimated that 676,246 registered voters lacked an ID.185  This report was 
accepted by the court to prove severe harm.186   
In sharp contrast, the Rokita plaintiffs submitted a report using 
similar comparisons.  However, that report was created by a statistical 
expert and made pursuant to the litigation.187  The Rokita court 
completely rejected this report as wholly unreliable evidence, severely 
criticizing the scientific methods used and the motive for creating the 
report.188  Similar to the effect of its conclusions regarding the lack of 
                                                 
181 Id. at 823. 
182 See infra notes 184-86 and accompanying text (discussing use of statistical evidence in 
Common Cause II and its effect on the court’s ultimate conclusion). 
183 Id. 
184 Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1306.  It is uncertain why the plaintiffs did not 
submit this report in Common Cause I as well.  It is also uncertain why the Secretary of State 
denied having knowledge of the numbers of voters without ID in her testimony and 
depositions.  See Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1331; Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1353. 
185 Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1311. 
186 Id. at 1345-46.  The court also noted statistical reports made from census data and data 
from the U.S. Department of Transportation estimated the number of voters without 
comporting photo ID to be 874,420.  Id. at 1306. 
187 Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 803-04.  Both the Common Cause II and Rokita statistical 
reports estimated potential voter disenfranchisement by comparing voter registration rolls 
with state licensing records.  Id. (criticizing the Brace Report for comparing current voter 
rolls with census data from several years ago); Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1311; see 
also 675,000 Voters, supra note 84. 
188 See generally Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 803-10.  The Rokita court’s disfavor of the 
statistical evidence was so strong that the court held it was entitled to “zero weight” in the 
court’s determination of summary judgment.  Id. at 804.  Although the Rokita court 
specifically criticized the methods used to create the data and did not elaborate on its claim 
of illicit motive, given the marked similarities in the methods used to create the reports in 
Common Cause II and Rokita, the source and motive may have also played a role in the 
courts analysis. 
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voter affidavits, the effect of the Rokita court’s decision to discard the 
statistical report caused the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims as “purely 
speculative[,]” and further supported the argument that the lack of 
evidence suggesting voter disenfranchisement was proof that the law 
was narrowly tailored and did not cause significant harm.189   
The practical effect of Rokita’s rejection of the plaintiffs’ evidence and 
subsequent dismissal of the claims was that the court was forced, or 
perhaps chose, to turn a “blind eye” to the potential disenfranchisement 
of thousands of Indiana voters.190  Regardless of the court’s reasoning, 
Rokita serves as a stern warning to those bringing Equal Protection 
claims against state voter ID laws to include a significant number of 
voter affidavits and scientifically reliable statistical reports to prove 
disenfranchisement.191   
Finally, in addition to voter affidavits and statistical reports, the use 
of evidence to show that exercising the right to vote is made more 
difficult by a state voter ID law is also essential to show severe harm and 
to justify the court’s adoption of a strict scrutiny analysis.192  For 
example, these types of evidence show:  (1) difficulty obtaining a voter 
ID; (2) insufficient voter outreach; (3) potential disenfranchisement of 
politically vulnerable classes; (4) inadequate alternatives to the law; (5) 
inadequate voter education; and (6) insufficient time to obtain a voter ID 
before the upcoming primary elections. 193    
3. Use of Strict Scrutiny is Likely Determinative of the Success of the 
Claim  
A court’s choice of analysis regarding Equal Protection challenges 
against state voter ID laws is likely determinative of the outcome of the 
                                                 
189 Id. at 825 n.75. 
190 See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing the estimated number of Indiana 
voters potentially affected by the law). 
191 Id. 
192 See Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1345-50; Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 
1362-66. 
193 See Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1345-50; Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 
1362-66.  These claims and others were raised in both Common Cause suits and were 
influential in the court’s determination of the harm as severe.  See Common Cause II, 439 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1345-50; Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1362-66.  Nearly identical concerns 
were raised in Rokita; however, because the court had previously rejected the plaintiffs’ 
statistical evidence and had faulted the plaintiffs for failing to provide voter affidavits to 
show proof of disenfranchisement, the court did not give significant consideration to them.  
See Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 824. 
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claim.194  If a court chooses strict scrutiny, either outright or under the 
Burdick test, the voter ID law will likely be struck down.195  Alternatively, 
if the court chooses to use rational basis review under the Burdick test, 
the court will likely uphold the voter ID statute as a reasonable time, 
place, and manner restriction on voting.196  For those cases proceeding 
under strict scrutiny, it is probable that the court will hold the regulatory 
interest in preventing voter fraud is compelling.197  Actual proof of in-
person voter fraud may not be necessary to justify the regulatory interest 
as compelling; however, a regulation enacted to prevent perceived voter 
fraud may be insufficient to qualify as a compelling.198   
Additionally, for those cases proceeding under strict scrutiny, the 
case law indicates that to be considered narrowly tailored, a voter ID law 
must actually address proven types of fraud in the state.199  For instance, 
in Common Cause I, the court found it counter-intuitive that the state 
legislature would impose severe restrictions on in-person voting where 
there had been no proof of fraud, while simultaneously loosening 
restrictions on absentee voting where actual voter fraud had been 
                                                 
194 See supra notes 66-68, 91-100, 108-12, 134-36 and accompanying text. 
195 See supra notes 91-100, 108-12, 134-36 and accompanying text (discussing holdings of 
the Common Cause and Weinschenk cases). 
196 See supra notes 66-68 (discussing the Rokita holding). 
197 See Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 826; see also Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1349-50; 
Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1362; Weinschenk, 203 S.W.3d at 217.  When the 
government’s interest is defined broadly to prevent voter fraud the interest has been held 
sufficiently important or compelling.  Id.  A more narrowly defined interest in preventing 
in-person voter fraud may be harder for the government to justify, given that no states, 
enacting voter ID laws, have been able to present evidence of in-person fraud in state.  Id. 
198 Weinschenk, 203 S.W.3d at 218.  Using perceived harm as a justification for creating 
laws which impacted a fundamental right, such as voting, was emphatically rejected by the 
Weinschenk court.  Id.  Legislating on voter perception of fraud is insufficient to justify 
government interference with the fundamental right to vote.  Id.  The Weinschenk court 
analyzed the law under strict scrutiny which requires narrow tailoring between the 
government’s interest and the means used to advance that interest.  Id. at 215.  In contrast, 
the Rokita court held that the state did not have to empirically justify its legislative purpose; 
however, if required to do so, despite a lack of evidence of in-person voting fraud in 
Indiana, evidence of in-person voter fraud in other states created the potential for fraud in 
Indiana and created voter perception of fraud, sufficiently justifying the enactment of 
Indiana’s voter ID law.  Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 826.  One explanation for such divergent 
opinions regarding the use of evidence of perceived fraud to justify the state’s interest is 
that the Rokita court utilized rational basis-like analysis which is highly deferential to the 
legislature.  Id. 
199 Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1361-62.  Several factors contributed to the court’s 
conclusion that the law was not narrowly tailored: (1) the lack of evidence proving in-
person voter fraud, (2) the legislative decision to loosen absentee ballot restrictions, (3) the 
legislative decision not to address known voter registration fraud, and (4) the availability of 
successful, less restrictive alternatives to prevent fraud.  Id. 
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proven.200  Similarly, narrow tailoring demands that the legislature 
choose the least drastic means available when burdening the 
fundamental right to vote.201  For example, in Common Cause I, the court 
argued that the use of criminal sanctions to deter in-person voting fraud 
and the more flexible list of documents to verify voter identity were 
effective and “less drastic” means for accomplishing the state’s purpose 
of preventing voter fraud.202   
In sum, a court’s decision to use strict scrutiny analysis to review an 
Equal Protection challenge to a voter ID law is crucial to the success of 
the claim.203  A court may choose to use strict scrutiny either outright or 
under the Burdick test.204  Regardless of the standard adopted, however, 
in order for a court to justify utilizing strict scrutiny, it must first 
determine that the harm imposed upon the right to vote is severe.205  
Severe harm is shown through voter affidavits and statistical reports 
which suggest voter disenfranchisement and through evidence showing 
that the right to vote has been made more difficult by the requirements 
of a voter ID statute.206  Once a court adopts strict scrutiny analysis, it 
will likely find that the state has a compelling interest in preventing 
fraud, but will probably hold that the voter ID law is not narrowly 
tailored due to a lack of proven in-person fraud in the state.207   
B. Poll Tax–Voter ID Statutes Impose a Direct Cost on the Right to Vote 
Another constitutional challenge with varying success thus far is the 
claim that state voter ID laws create an unconstitutional poll tax by 
imposing an impermissible cost on the right to vote.208  There are two 
                                                 
200 Id. at 1366.  The court relied heavily on testimony of Secretary of State Cathy Cox, who 
testified to the lack of in-person fraud in comparison to the prevalence of fraud in voter 
registration and absentee voting.  Id. at 1350-52.  Similarly, while subsequently reviewing 
the law under the Burdick test, the Common Cause I court additionally argued that the law 
was likely not even rationally based on preventing voter fraud.   Id. at 1366. 
201 Id. at 1361. 
202 Id. at 1362. 
203 See supra notes 194-202 and accompanying text. 
204 See supra notes 194-202 and accompanying text. 
205 See supra notes 194-202 and accompanying text. 
206 See supra notes 194-202 and accompanying text. 
207 See supra notes 194-202 and accompanying text. 
208 See supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text (discussing the legal tests used to analyze 
poll tax challenges against state voter ID laws).  In federal courts, plaintiffs have argued 
that state voter ID laws violate the Fourteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution.  See Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1352; Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1367-68; Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 826-27.  However, in Weinschenk, a Missouri court 
analyzed the imposition of such costs under the state Equal Protection clause, but 
characterized the costs in terms of an “undue burden” on the right to vote.  Weinschenk, 203 
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possible ways in which to argue that a state voter ID law creates an 
unconstitutional poll tax.209  The first argument, claiming that a state 
voter ID law imposes primary costs on the right to vote, has only been 
successful in one case where the state mandated and simultaneously 
increased a direct fee to obtain a voter ID.210  Because most states now 
require that voter IDs be issued without charge, a more common 
argument is that secondary costs, incidental to obtaining a voter ID, 
impose impermissible costs on the right to vote.211  Thus far, such 
secondary cost arguments have had limited success.212  However, recent 
case law suggests that such claims may be more effective in future cases 
due to recent judicial analysis revealing an overlap between state voter 
ID laws and the REAL ID Act, which together necessitate incurring 
documentation costs to obtain a voter ID.213   
1. Voter ID Statutes Impose Primary Costs on the Right to Vote 
A poll tax is likely found whenever a material requirement is directly 
imposed as a pre-requisite to voting.214  In the cases analyzing voter ID 
laws thus far, both a twenty dollar fee and a poverty affidavit 
requirement have been held to be impermissible primary costs on the 
right to vote.215  It did not appear difficult for the Common Cause I court 
to hold that Georgia’s $20 fee to obtain a voter ID imposed a direct cost 
on the right to vote.216  Although the state argued that the fee was 
necessary to offset the administrative costs of distributing the IDs, the 
                                                                                                             
S.W.3d at 210-19.  Although the Weinschenk holdings are based on a state Constitution and 
made pursuant to equal protection analysis, the court’s reasoning regarding direct and 
indirect costs on the right to vote remains applicable for comparison with federal poll tax 
claims as well.  Id. 
209 See supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text. 
210 Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1366-70.  The Georgia state legislature 
simultaneously raised the cost of IDs when passing the voter ID law.  See supra note 79 and 
accompanying text.  The Common Cause I court held that, even though the state attempted 
to justify the cost as covering administrative costs, the law still imposed an impermissible 
fee on the right to vote.  Id. at 1366, 1369. 
211 See supra notes 71-73, 113-16, 128-36 and accompanying text (discussing judicial 
analysis of claims that state voter ID laws impose secondary costs on the right to vote). 
212 See Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1355-56 (rejected poll tax claims based on 
secondary costs); Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 827 (same). 
213 As more states adopt the requirements of the Real ID Act of 2005, such secondary cost 
claims will likely gain more success as courts will have less room to argue that such costs 
are avoidable through use of more flexible lists of acceptable proof of identity to obtain a 
state-issued voter ID. 
214 See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text (providing a brief overview of Twenty-
Fourth Amendment precedent). 
215 Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1369-70. 
216 Id. 
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court argued that calling it a fee instead of a cost did not change it from 
being a cost on the right to vote.217  Given that no states have since 
included a fee requirement in subsequently-enacted voter ID laws, it 
appears likely that the Common Cause I opinion has served as a 
bellwether against such requirements.218   
Similarly, although somewhat less clear for predicting future judicial 
decisions, Common Cause I additionally held that the requirement for 
indigent voters to sign a poverty affidavit in order to vote without an ID 
imposed a direct and material cost on the right to vote.219  Primarily, the 
Common Cause I court held that the poverty affidavit alternative was 
unconstitutional because it would cause some to forgo voting out of 
embarrassment or fear of perjuring themselves, having a chilling effect 
on voting.220  However, in muddling contrast, the Rokita court upheld a 
similar provision in the Indiana voter ID law, holding that Indiana’s 
poverty affidavit exception was an adequate safeguard for preventing 
disenfranchisement of indigent voters.221   
On their faces, the two outcomes appear somewhat irreconcilable, 
especially given the limited reasoning provided by the Rokita court’s 
decision.222  However, for those attempting to litigate the issue in the 
future, it may prove useful to emphasize that voter ID laws’ poverty 
affidavit requirements will have a chilling effect on the votes of low 
income voters.223  As with all claims, this argument should be supported 
by affidavits of low-income and truly-indigent voters, unwilling to sign 
                                                 
217 Id. at 1366, 1369. 
218 See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s reasoning in 
Common Cause I). 
219 Common Cause I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1369-70 (2005). 
220 Id.  Even though the Georgia DDS claimed that they had a “no questions asked” 
policy regarding the affidavits, the Common Cause I court held that the policy was not 
publicized and was contrary to the stated purpose of the affidavit.   Id.   The court also 
noted that many voters lacking government-issued ID did not believe themselves to be 
indigent but did not have the $20 to spend on a voter ID.  Id. at 1340-42. 
221 See Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 823 n.70, 824 n.73, 829 (arguing perfunctorily that the 
indigency exception served as an adequate safety valve to prevent indigent and homeless 
voters from losing their right to vote).  Indiana’s “indigency exception” permitted indigent 
voters to vote by provisional ballot without and ID, conditioned on their return to sign a 
poverty affidavit the following week.  Id. 
222 See supra notes 220-21. 
223 Additionally, a potential Equal Protection challenge may exist, given that such 
requirements mandate that the poor take additional steps to vote, both in having to sign an 
affidavit attesting to their indigence and in having to make extra trips to the clerk’s office to 
insure that their votes are counted. 
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such documents or unable to make multiple trips to ensure that their 
votes are counted.224   
2. Voter ID Statutes Impose Secondary Costs on the Right to Vote 
The more likely poll tax claim to be brought against state voter ID 
laws is that voter ID laws impermissibly require voters to incur 
secondary documentation costs to obtain a government-issued photo 
ID.225  The most commonly alleged documentation costs are the 
monetary expenses incurred while gathering certified documentation of 
identity, requisite in some states to obtain a government-issued photo 
ID.226   
Rokita, the first court to consider the issue, summarily rejected the 
argument that secondary costs imposed by voter ID laws impose an 
impermissible poll tax.227  Characterizing the argument as a “dramatic 
overstatement of what fairly constitutes a ‘poll tax,’” the court argued 
that such tangential burdens were incidental to all forms of voting and 
did not transform a valid voting “regulation” into a poll tax.228  Although 
the court surmised that the costs of obtaining a birth certificate might 
plausibly be regarded as imposing a cost on the right to vote, the Rokita 
court argued that the chance of voters having to incur the costs was 
“purely speculative,” given that the plaintiffs had not presented 
affidavits of voters actually incurring them.229  Alternatively, the Rokita 
court deflected responsibility for such costs, should they exist, away from 
the states claiming that the federal government was responsible for 
setting the costs of such documents.230  In effect, the Rokita court 
attempted to speak out of both sides of its mouth, arguing on the one 
hand that voters are unlikely to incur documentation costs while 
simultaneously arguing that, should voters actually incur such costs, the 
                                                 
224 See supra notes 176-81 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of using 
voter affidavits to prove harm). 
225 See supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text. 
226 See supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text. 
227 Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 827. 
228 Id. 
229 Id.  To further support its reasoning that few voters would be adversely affected by 
Indiana’s voter ID law, the Rokita court, using statistical conclusions from the previously 
rejected Brace Report, noted that the majority of Indiana residents already had a state-
issued photo ID.  Id.  The Brace Report estimated that, as of 2005, fewer than 1 percent of 
Indiana’s voting age population, approximately forty-three thousand residents, lack ID.  Id. 
at 807.  However, with numerous elections being decided on less than a few thousand votes 
in recent years, this small percentage of potentially disenfranchised voters has significant 
potential to sway the outcome of elections in tighter races. 
230 Id. at 827-28. 
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ultimate responsibility for documents issued by the federal government 
rests on the federal government and not the Indiana legislature.231   
The court’s argument that the majority of Indiana voters will not 
have to pay a fee in the process of obtaining a voter ID, while potentially 
sound on a strict evidentiary basis because of the lack of supporting 
affidavits, is illogical and potentially dangerous.232  Because the express 
requirements of the Indiana voter ID law mandate the showing of 
government documentation such as a birth certificate in order to obtain a 
voter ID, it is almost impossible to believe that no Indiana voters will 
ever have to obtain such a document.233  Additionally making the court’s 
argument particularly suspect, is that rather than simply dismissing the 
claim for lack of evidentiary support, the Rokita court went further to 
hold that the lack of evidence was “a testament to the law’s minimal 
burden and narrow crafting” and proof of the law’s adequate safeguards 
against disenfranchisement.234  Even without affidavits, it seems to go 
against common sense and rudimentary statutory interpretation to 
accept the court’s conclusion that few Indiana voters would be 
disenfranchised by the law, particularly on account of the safeguards 
within the voter ID law itself.235   
Similarly, in reaching its conclusions to deflect responsibility for 
federal documentation costs, should they actually occur, onto the federal 
government, the Rokita court ignores that the Indiana legislature 
expressly required voters to present certified government identification 
in order to obtain a voter ID.236  Thus, regardless of which legislative 
                                                 
231 Id. 
232 The fundamental right to vote is arguably the most important right because it is the 
only way to secure other rights in a representative democracy.  See Common 
Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1359 (N.D. Ga. 2005).  If even a relatively 
few number of voters are forced to incur costs in order to vote, or, worse, choose to forgo 
voting because of inability to pay the cost, the social harm would be severe.  But see supra 
note 76 (J. Richard Posner argues that severe harm should be determined by quantifiable 
numbers of disenfranchisement rather than by subjective value judgments regarding the 
right to vote). 
233 The Indiana statute expressly mandates that a registered voter must show a primary 
identifying document, exclusively limited to a birth certificate, passport, or merchant 
marine photo ID.  See Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 790 (highlighting the primary document 
requirement). 
234 Id. at 823. 
235 It might be argued that, in coming to its conclusion, the Rokita court relied on the 
ability of voters without a birth certificate to forgo obtaining an ID and voting by absentee 
ballot as a way of circumventing documentation costs.   However, this argument is also 
suspect because it encourages voters to seek ways around the law rather than allowing 
them to comply with its requirements without cost. 
236 See IND. CODE §§ 3-5-2-40.5, 3-10-1-7.2, 3-11-8-25.1 (2006). 
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body ultimately sets the costs for acquiring such documents, it was the 
state’s voter ID law and not the federal government which set up Indiana 
voters to incur those costs, unilaterally mandating voters who lack a 
government-issued photo ID to incur an expense in order to vote.237  To 
argue after the fact that the state played no role because the costs of such 
documents are outside of its control seems incredulous. 238   
The second court to consider the issue, Common Cause II, also held 
that secondary costs do not constitute a poll tax.239  However, rather than 
critically analyzing the effect of secondary costs on the right to vote, the 
court’s opinion seems influenced more by a desire to encourage the 
good-faith efforts of the Georgia legislature to revise its voter ID law to 
comply with the court’s previous Common Cause I ruling, in regards to 
primary costs.240  Regardless of motive, the holding in Common Cause II 
seems more justified than the Rokita decision given the different primary 
document required by Georgia’s statute.241  Specifically, unlike Indiana’s 
voter ID statute, Georgia’s law did not exclusively mandate a certified 
government document to verify identity, permitting voter ID applicants 
to show multiple forms of ID and theoretically allowing them to avoid 
secondary documentation costs.242  Thus, unlike the Rokita court which 
claimed that secondary monetary costs were only speculatively incurred 
                                                 
237 Id. 
238 Id. 
239 See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text. 
240 Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d  1294, 1354 (N.D. Ga. 2006).  For 
instance, following Common Cause I’s injunction against the 2005 version of the law on 
grounds that Georgia’s voter ID law likely violated Equal Protection and imposed an 
unconstitutional poll tax, the Georgia legislature acted quickly to amend the law, dropping 
the $20 fee and poverty affidavit requirements from the law, two elements of the 2005 law 
which were especially disfavored by the Common Cause I court.  Id.  The Common Cause II 
court, while claiming that the legislature had still not come far enough to bring the law into 
compliance with the constitution, based on Equal Protection grounds, was quick to 
encourage the legislature’s efforts to avoid imposing a poll tax as “admirable.”  Id. at 1351. 
241 See GA. ANN. STAT. § 21-2-417.1(e)(1) (2006) (listing other acceptable documents to 
prove identity). 
242 Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1355; see also GA. ANN. STAT. § 21-2-417.1(e)(1) 
(2006) (listing other acceptable documents to prove identity).  However, as Georgia adopts 
the requirements of the Real ID Act of 2005, the overlap of federal and state laws will 
absolutely require certified government identification to obtain a government-issued ID, 
placing the Common Cause II conclusion on much shakier grounds.  See supra notes 130-32 
and accompanying text.  See also infra notes 244-47 (analyzing the Weinschenk court’s 
reasoning). 
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due to a lack of evidence, the Common Cause II court argued the same on 
much firmer statutory grounds.243   
Potentially altering the direction of analysis on this issue, the unique 
reasoning in Weinschenk may prove most influential in cases considering 
whether the secondary documentation costs impose impermissible costs 
on the right to vote.244  Using the statutory overlap of Missouri’s voter ID 
law and the federal REAL ID Act of 2005 as justification for its holding 
and relying on affidavits of registered voters actually incurring 
documentation costs, the Weinschenk court concluded that the secondary 
documentation costs, necessary to obtain a voter ID card, did impose an 
impermissible cost on the right to vote.245  The REAL ID Act mandates 
that every person must prove U.S. citizenship by showing either a 
certified birth certificate or U.S. passport before obtaining a government-
issued photo ID.246  The Weinschenk court astutely noted that when this 
federal requirement is read in conjunction with the overlapping 
requirement of Missouri’s voter ID law, mandating the use of a 
government-issued photo ID to vote, any voter lacking a state-issued 
photo ID and a certified document to prove identity must unavoidably 
incur a cost in order to vote.247   
Under the Weinschenk reasoning, even if a state voter ID law includes 
a broader list of identifying documents, due to the statutory overlap with 
the REAL ID Act, the state is federally mandated to require either a birth 
                                                 
243 Common Cause II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1355.  What is unnecessary and potentially 
confusing in the Common Cause II opinion, however, is the adoption of language from the 
Rokita decision, characterizing the potential for voters to incur secondary costs as 
“speculative.”  Id.  Whereas Rokita’s “speculative” language is based on the lack of voter 
affidavits to support the plaintiffs’ claim, the Common Cause II court’s characterization of 
“speculative” harm is based on distinct statutory requirements in the Georgia voter ID law.  
See supra notes 241-42.  The danger in Common Cause II’s use of language similar to that 
used in Rokita is that future courts may not consider the fundamentally different reasoning 
between the two decisions, mistakenly concluding that incurring secondary costs is always 
speculative. 
244 Although the Weinschenk court considered the issue of secondary costs under the state 
Equal Protection clause, the court’s reasoning is applicable to the federal poll tax issue, 
given the use of comparable language and reasoning by the court.  Weinschenk v. Mo., 203 
S.W.3d 201, 210-19 (Mo. 2006).  Using language of both Equal Protection and poll tax 
analysis, the Weinschenk court held that secondary costs impermissibly imposed a direct 
cost and unduly burdened the right to vote.  Id. at 214. 
245 Id. at 207-08, 219. 
246 Id. at 208 (citing Pub. L. No. 109-13., tit. II). 
247 Id. at 207-08, 210-19.  It appears that this reasoning is applicable to all states where this 
statutory overlap exists, potentially impacting future cases considering the issue of 
secondary costs imposing a poll tax. 
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certificate or U.S. passport before issuing a voter ID.248  Thus, in cases 
like Common Cause II which held that the broad list of documents 
accepted to obtain a Georgia voter ID made incurring secondary costs 
potentially avoidable, the statutory overlap with the REAL ID Act would 
eliminate this possibility.249   
In sum, state voter ID laws may impose impermissible material 
requirements on the right to vote in two ways.250  Voter ID laws impose 
primary costs on the right to vote through direct fees to obtain an ID or 
through poverty affidavit exceptions, which require voters to attest to 
indigency and take extra steps to vote.251  Additionally, although the law 
in this area is still developing, voter ID laws may also impose secondary 
costs on the right to vote by requiring voters to incur documentation 
costs to obtain a voter ID.252   
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
This Note attempts to analyze how the law is developing in order to 
draw thoughtful conclusions as to where rapidly-developing state voter-
ID law is headed, rather than haphazardly attempting to direct its 
development.  Reflecting on this analysis, Part IV constructs a blueprint 
for bringing successful Equal Protection and poll tax challenges against 
state voter ID laws, synthesizing trends gleaned from successful claims 
and cases decided thus far.253  Following the presentation of a blueprint, 
or checklist, of steps to take to advance successful challenges to state 
voter ID laws, Part IV provides additional subsections which further 
emphasize and explain the importance of taking each step in light of the 
initial cases decided, and which provide methods for pursuing each step 
in greater detail.   
                                                 
248 Id. 
249 See supra note 213 and accompanying text.  However, regardless of the potential 
statutory overlap, without affidavits of actual voters lacking a government-issued photo ID 
and a requisite birth certificate, the Rokita court would likely fall back on its primary 
argument that the harm is “speculative.”  Even with affidavits, the Rokita court would 
likely attempt to shift the burden for such costs onto the federal government again.  See 
Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 827 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (claiming that 
such costs may be  out of the state’s control). 
250 See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text. 
251 See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text. 
252 See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text. 
253 Part IV will not attempt to suggest a particular framework for judicial analysis, given 
the law is too quickly changing and would quickly render such guesses moot.  Nor will 
Part IV attempt to propose alternatives and safeguards to voter ID laws, as these concepts 
are currently being explored in contemporary scholarship.  See generally Spencer Overton, 
Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631 (2007). 
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In order to advance successful Equal Protection and poll tax claims 
against state voter ID laws, litigators would be prudent to take the 
following steps:   
A. Bringing a Successful Equal Protection Claim against a 
State Voter ID Law 
1. Advocate that the court adopt the use of strict 
scrutiny analysis either outright or under the 
Burdick test by persuading the court that the law 
imposes severe harm. 
a. Emphasize that the right to vote is 
fundamental. 
b. Effectively utilize sufficient and reliable 
evidence to prove voter disenfranchisement 
through voter affidavits and statistical 
reports. 
c. Stress the significant burdens that the 
law imposes on the right to vote. 
2. Successfully advocate under strict scrutiny 
analysis that the law is not narrowly tailored to 
advance a compelling government interest by 
emphasizing that the law does not rationally prevent 
or reduce existing voter fraud in the state. 
B. Bringing a Successful Poll Tax Claim against a State 
Voter ID Law 
1. Argue that the law imposes primary costs on the 
right to vote through fee and poverty affidavit 
requirements. 
2.  Argue that the law imposes secondary costs on 
the right to vote by directly or indirectly forcing 
voters to incur documentation expenses. 
A.  Bringing a Successful Equal Protection Claim against a State Voter ID Law 
Part IV.A states the necessary steps to bringing a successful Equal 
Protection challenge against state voter ID laws, demonstrating why the 
steps are important in light of the case law and explaining how to apply 
each step in terms of general litigation strategy.  
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1. Advocating the Use of Strict Scrutiny Analysis 
Two methods have been used to analyze whether a state voter ID 
law imposes an undue burden on the right to vote.254  A voter ID law 
analyzed under strict scrutiny will likely be struck down as not being 
narrowly-tailored.255  In contrast, a court’s decision to use rational basis 
analysis under the Burdick test will likely prove fatal to claims against a 
voter ID statute.256  Plaintiffs must persuade the court that strict scrutiny 
is warranted, either outright or under the Burdick test, to improve the 
potential success of their Equal Protection claim.257  To do so, it is 
essential that plaintiffs prove that the harm imposed by a voter ID law is 
severe.258  Based on current precedent, proving that severe harm is done 
by emphasizing the right to vote as fundamental, effectively utilizing 
sufficient and reliable evidence of voter disenfranchisement, and 
simultaneously stressing the cumulative burdens imposed on the right to 
vote by state voter ID laws.   
a. Characterizing the Harm as Severe:  Emphasizing the Right To Vote As 
Fundamental 
Although definitive correlations are somewhat difficult to make 
from the few cases thus far decided, courts which have expansively 
characterized the right to vote as fundamental and have emphasized the 
state’s regulatory authority as limited have chosen strict scrutiny 
analysis.259  Alternatively, the only court to use rational basis review 
under the Burdick test only cursorily noted the right to vote as 
fundamental and provided a more expansive discussion of the power of 
the state to regulate the administration of that right.260  Thus, plaintiffs 
challenging a voter ID law under Equal Protection should vigorously 
emphasize the right to vote as fundamental.  In doing so, plaintiffs 
should argue that the right to vote is one of the most important rights, 
forming the basis for protecting all other rights in a democratic society.261  
Likewise, plaintiffs should emphasize that the state’s regulatory power is 
                                                 
254 See supra notes 32-38. 
255 See Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1361-62 (N.D. Ga. 2005) 
(using strict scrutiny under the Burdick test); Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 439 F. 
Supp. 2d 1294, 1349-50 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (using strict scrutiny under the Burdick test); 
Weinschenk v. Missouri, 203 S.W.3d 201, 215-16 (Mo. 2006) (using strict scrutiny outright). 
256 See, e.g., Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 826 (S.D. Ind. 2005). 
257 See generally supra notes 161-72  and accompanying text. 
258 See generally supra notes 161-72 and accompanying text. 
259 See generally supra notes 161-72 and accompanying text. 
260 Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 820-30. 
261 See generally supra notes 161-72 and accompanying text. 
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limited by constitutional provisions, such as the provision against 
unduly burdening the fundamental right to vote.262  Plaintiffs should 
similarly underscore that the fundamental right to vote is of particular 
importance to the politically and economically vulnerable, emphasizing 
that such voters have few alternative avenues to gain influence in 
today’s aristocratic democracy.263   
b. Characterizing the Harm as Severe: Utilizing Evidence to Prove 
Disenfranchisement 
Next, arguably the most important factor for characterizing the harm 
as severe is the sufficiency and reliability of evidence submitted to prove 
voter disenfranchisement.264  The types of evidence most influential in a 
court’s decision are affidavits of registered voters prohibited or 
dissuaded from voting, and statistical evidence predicting the extent of 
potential disenfranchisement.265  Voter affidavits are necessary to prove 
actual harm to individual voters and are critical to the success of every 
claim.266  Without affidavits of voters actually incurring the harm 
alleged, courts are given the freedom to not provide clear judicial 
reasoning, arguing instead that the harm is “speculative” or more 
audaciously arguing that the lack of evidence represents a voter ID law’s 
narrow tailoring to prevent disenfranchisement.267  Thus, to bolster every 
claim, especially claims involving voter disenfranchisement, plaintiffs 
should identify numerous voters who will actually incur the harm 
alleged.268   
Similarly, as important as the use of voter affidavits, plaintiffs’ 
efficacious use of statistical evidence is necessary to establish proof of 
severe harm.269  Such reports are essential for estimating the scope of 
potential disenfranchisement that a state voter ID law will have on 
vulnerable classes of voters.270  The most common method used to 
estimate disenfranchisement is the use of data comparisons between the 
number of residents or registered voters in the state the number of 
residents without state-issued photo identification.271  However, 
                                                 
262 See generally supra notes 161-72 and accompanying text. 
263 See generally supra notes 161-72 and accompanying text. 
264 See generally supra notes 173-93 and accompanying text. 
265 See generally supra notes 173-93 and accompanying text. 
266 See generally supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text. 
267 See generally supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text. 
268 See generally supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text. 
269 See generally supra notes 182-91 and accompanying text. 
270 See generally supra notes 182-91 and accompanying text. 
271 See generally supra notes 182-91 and accompanying text. 
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statistical reports prepared using this method alone may be insufficient 
to ensure a court’s adoption of the report in its subsequent analysis.272   
Plaintiffs preparing such reports should be careful to ensure that the 
methods employed for creating them comport with the requirements of 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702.273  Additionally, the source and motive for 
the creation of statistical reports may be influential in the court’s decision 
to accept the report as reliable evidence.274  For instance, statistical 
reports created by government officials and made pursuant to official 
duty or legislation may be considered more dependable than reports 
made by statistical experts in preparation of trial.275  However, since the 
ready existence of reports made by government officials is out of the 
plaintiffs’ control, plaintiffs submitting their own reports should focus 
on using reliable methods to ensure scientific reliability.276   
c. Characterizing the Harm as Severe:  Stressing the Burdens on the Right to 
Vote 
Finally, important for characterizing the harm as severe and 
influential in the court’s decision to use strict scrutiny analysis is the use 
of the record as a whole to show that the right to vote is substantially 
burdened by the requirements of a state voter ID law.277  Effectively 
stressing the cumulative burdens is accomplished by highlighting every 
roadblock imposed by the requirements of a voter ID law, which makes 
the process of voting significantly more difficult.278  Such roadblocks 
include:  (1) difficulty obtaining an ID due to lack of transportation, 
distantly located licensing offices, or inconvenient hours of operation; (2) 
significant time and transportation costs to obtain requisite 
documentation; (3) inadequate voter education of a law’s newly-imposed 
requirements; (4) insufficient time to comply with a law before an 
approaching election; or (5) inappropriate alternatives to a law’s strict ID 
                                                 
272 See generally supra notes 182-91 and accompanying text. 
273 Id.  FRE 702 sets the admissibility standards for expert testimony used to assist the 
trier of fact to determine a fact in issue.  See Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. 
Supp. 2d 775, 803-09 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (discussing the faults of the Brace Report).  These 
standards require that: (1) the testimony is based on upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied 
the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.  Id. 
274 See generally supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text. 
275 See generally supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text. 
276 See generally supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text. 
277 See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text. 
278 See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text. 
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requirement, such as unrealistic provisional ballots and highly 
sophisticated absentee ballots.279   
In sum, successfully characterizing the harm as severe is essential to 
a court’s decision to use strict scrutiny analysis and to the likely success 
of an Equal Protection claim.  Thus, to prove severe harm, plaintiffs 
should be sure to emphasize the right to vote as fundamental, effectively 
utilize sufficient and reliable evidence of voter disenfranchisement, and 
simultaneously stress the cumulative burdens imposed on the right to 
vote by state voter ID laws.   
2. Advocating Under Strict Scrutiny Analysis 
Regardless of a state’s ability to produce actual evidence of in-person 
voter fraud, most courts will likely hold that a state’s interest in 
preventing voter fraud is compelling.280  Thus, once a court has elected to 
use strict scrutiny analysis, plaintiffs must argue that the stringent photo 
ID requirement of a state voter ID law is not narrowly tailored to serve 
the government’s interest.281  The best chance for success is to argue that 
the strict requirement of a state voter ID law, as applied, is counter-
intuitive to the proffered legislative purpose of combating voter fraud.282  
In doing so, plaintiffs should emphasize the lack of evidence of in-person 
fraud in the state and, whenever applicable, plaintiffs should point out 
that the law ignores or makes easier areas of voting where actual fraud 
has been proven, such as absentee voting and voter registration.283  
Additionally, plaintiffs should argue that narrow tailoring requires state 
legislatures to use the least drastic means and choose the least restrictive 
alternatives when enacting laws that impact a fundamental right.284  
Subsequently, plaintiffs should argue that the lack of evidence of in-
person voting fraud is proof that the previous identification 
requirements were effective to prevent fraud and were less restrictive 
than the state’s voter ID law.285   
In sum, plaintiffs bringing claims against voter ID laws under Equal 
Protection must convince a court that strict scrutiny analysis is 
                                                 
279 See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text (evidence of such factors should also be 
sufficiently backed up with affidavits of individual voters actually incurring the alleged 
harm). 
280 See generally supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text. 
281 See generally supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text. 
282 See generally supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text. 
283 See generally supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text. 
284 See generally supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text. 
285 See generally supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text. 
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warranted, given the severe harm imposed by the law.  Severe harm is 
shown through voter affidavits, statistical reports, and evidence 
highlighting the increased difficulty in the ability to vote as a result of 
the requirements of a state voter ID law.  Once strict scrutiny is adopted, 
either outright or under the Burdick test, plaintiffs must show through 
common-sense presentation of the evidence that the law’s requirement is 
not narrowly tailored to the state’s goal of preventing fraud.  
B. Bringing a Successful Poll Tax Claim Against a State Voter ID Law 
Part IV.B explains the necessary steps for bringing a successful poll 
tax challenge against state voter ID laws, explaining why the steps are 
important in light of the case law and how to apply each step in terms of 
general litigation strategy.  The claim that state voter ID laws impose 
unconstitutional costs on the right to vote can be brought under two 
theories.  The first theory is that voter ID laws impose primary costs by 
mandating a fee or by requiring an indigent voter to sign a poverty 
affidavit.  The second theory is that voter ID laws impose secondary costs 
by indirectly requiring voters to spend time and money acquiring 
documentation.  
1. State Voter ID Laws Impose Primary Costs through Fee and Poverty 
Affidavit Requirements 
State voter ID laws which impose a mandatory fee to obtain a voter 
ID will likely be struck down easily, given that such requirements more 
clearly violate the express constitutional prohibition against poll taxes.286  
This is true regardless of whether the state attempts to argue that the cost 
is a necessary fee to cover administrative costs.287  Given the obvious 
constitutional violation, no states have since included a mandatory fee in 
subsequent voter ID laws and will likely not include them in the future.  
Thus, the more likely claim is that poverty affidavit requirements, 
requiring voters to sign an affidavit attesting to indigency before voting 
without an ID, impose primary costs on the right to vote.288  Under this 
claim, plaintiffs should argue that such requirements are material and 
will have a chilling effect on voting, causing many to forgo voting rather 
than face potential embarrassment or risk perjuring themselves by 
signing a poverty affidavit.289  Similarly, plaintiffs should also argue that 
poverty affidavit requirements, which necessitate additional steps to 
                                                 
286 See generally supra notes 214-22 and accompanying text. 
287 See generally supra notes 214-22 and accompanying text. 
288 See generally supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text. 
289 See generally supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text. 
Brewer: Disenfranchise This: State Voter ID Laws and Their Discontents, a
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
238 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
vote (such as a return trip to a registrar’s office following an election) 
will also have a chilling effect on voting due to the added costs of time 
and travel.290  
2. State Voter ID Laws Impose Secondary Costs through 
Documentation Expenses 
Claiming that the secondary costs imposed by voter ID statutes 
constitute a poll tax consistently fails in federal court.291  However, such 
claims may still prove successful in the future, especially when 
supported by voter affidavits and when understood in light of the 
statutory overlap with the REAL ID Act of 2005.292  In response to the 
argument that voter ID statutes impermissibly impose secondary costs 
on the right to vote, most judges have argued that voters may not be 
forced to actually incur such costs.293  The primary method for justifying 
their reasoning in this regard is to note the lack of affidavits identifying 
voters who have actually incurred or will incur documentation costs in 
order to obtain a voter ID.294  Thus, as with all claims, plaintiffs should 
present affidavits of voters actually forced to incur a monetary expense 
to acquire a birth certificate or other required government document in 
the process of obtaining a voter ID card.295  
Another judicial response to the argument that voter ID statutes 
impose secondary costs on the right to vote is to argue that 
documentation costs are avoidable due to a voter ID statute’s flexible list 
of identifying documents used to obtain a voter ID.296  In this situation, 
the court argues that a state voter ID law does not impose secondary 
costs because the law does not exclusively mandate a birth certificate or 
passport to verify identity for the purposes of obtaining an ID.297  
However, in states where the federal REAL ID Act of 2005 has taken 
effect, plaintiffs should argue that the statutory overlap between the 
federal and state requirements imposes secondary documentation costs 
on the right to vote.298  Building on the reasoning of the Weinschenk court 
and documenting the monetary costs necessary to acquire a birth 
                                                 
290 See generally supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text. 
291 See generally supra notes 227-43 and accompanying text. 
292 See generally supra notes 227-43 and accompanying text. 
293 See generally supra notes 227-43 and accompanying text. 
294 See generally supra notes 227-43 and accompanying text. 
295 See supra notes 176-81 and accompanying text. 
296 See generally supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text. 
297 See generally supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text. 
298 See generally supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text. 
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certificate and requisite for obtaining a state voter ID should prove 
convincing on this claim.299   
In sum, plaintiffs bringing poll tax claims against voter ID statutes 
can argue that such laws impose both primary and secondary costs on 
the right to vote.  Plaintiffs arguing primary costs should attack any 
mandatory fees or poverty affidavit requirements imposed by a voter ID 
law, pointing out clear constitutional violations and the chilling effect 
that such requirements will have on voting.  Similarly, plaintiffs arguing 
secondary costs should present voter affidavits of actual voters incurring 
monetary expenses to acquire the requisite identifying documents to 
obtain a voter ID; they should emphasize that the statutory overlap 
between the federal REAL ID Act and the state voter ID law mandates 
the states to require a more limited, and ultimately more costly, list of 
identifying documents to issue a voter ID.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
Given the high number of voters potentially disenfranchised by 
extra-stringent voter ID laws and the disproportionate impact that such 
laws may have on particularly vulnerable classes of voters, it is 
imperative that such laws do not take effect as proposed.  Because the 
right to vote is often the only way for the socially and economically 
vulnerable in society to preserve their rights, the loss of the right is 
particularly detrimental.  Thus, regardless of the illicit political 
motivations for and against enacting state voter ID laws, it is crucial that 
future legal challenges prove successful.  Ideally, this Note will serve as a 
useful tool for litigators presently bringing claims against state voter ID 
laws and will lay the foundation for a more comprehensive legal analysis 
in the future.  
Exploring the factual background and subsequent judicial treatment 
of three similarly enacted voter ID statutes, this Note deduces factors 
which contribute to successful claims against these laws.  Building on 
conclusions from this analysis, this Note constructs a blueprint for 
bringing successful Equal Protection and poll tax claims against similarly 
enacted laws in the future.  Given the prevalent enactment of state voter 
ID laws and the gravity of potential harm imposed by them, effective 
utilization of the factors set forth in this Note may prove influential in 
preserving the fundamental right to vote for millions of Americans in the 
future.   
                                                 
299 See generally supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text. 
Brewer: Disenfranchise This: State Voter ID Laws and Their Discontents, a
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
240 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
VI. AFTERWORD 
While anticipating publication of this Note, rapid developments took 
place during the Summer of 2007.  On June 11, 2007, the Georgia 
Supreme Court vacated the Fulton County Superior Court decision in 
Perdue v. Lake, concluding that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge 
the Georgia voter ID statute.300  Two weeks later, the Federal Court of the 
Northern District of Georgia lifted the stay of proceedings in the federal 
case and set trial on the merits.301  On Sept. 6, 2007, mimicking the 
approach and frequently citing the Rokita opinion, district court Judge J. 
Murphy declined to issue a further injunction against the Georgia voter 
ID law.302  Throwing out the testimony of the plaintiffs’ experts 
regarding voter disenfranchisement, the court adopted the language and 
reasoning of Rokita stating, “[p]laintiffs have failed to produce any 
evidence of any individual . . . who would undergo any appreciable 
hardship to obtain photo identification in order to be qualified to 
vote.”303  The court further adopted the language and reasoning of 
Purcell v. Gonzalez, arguing that the state had a compelling interest in 
preventing perceived voter fraud and that the law should be upheld 
under rational basis analysis.304  Although the court’s merits discussion 
is arguably dicta, given the court’s prior determination regarding 
                                                 
300 Perdue v. Lake, 647 S.E.2d 6 (Ga. 2007); see also Common Cause v. Billups, 2007 WL 
2601438 *5 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (“Common Cause III”). 
301 See Common Cause v. Billups, 2007 WL 2601438, *5 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (“Common Cause 
III”). 
302 Id. 
303 Id. at *37-38, *47 (quoting Indiana Dem. Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 821-23 
(S.D. Ind. 2006). 
304 Id. at *47-48 (quoting Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 5, 7 (2006)) (“a state indisputably 
has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election process.”. . .”[v]oters 
who fear their legitimate votes will be outweighed by fraudulent ones will feel 
disenfranchised.”) (emphasis added); see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices Agree to Hear Case 
Challenging Voter ID Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at A24 [hereinafter “Greenhouse”] 
(noting the shift in judicial reasoning that preventing perception of voter fraud is a sufficient 
state interest to overcome the risk of actual disenfranchisement). 
 Directly controverting its previous analysis, the Common Cause III court went on to 
argue that Georgia’s voter ID law was “rationally related” to the state’s compelling interest 
in preventing fraud.  Common Cause III, 2007 WL 2601438, *48 n.9 (“In a previous Order, the 
Court speculated that the Photo ID requirement probably was not even rationally related to 
the asserted justification of preventing voting fraud. That speculation, however, is not 
binding on the Court and, frankly, proved to be inaccurate.”); see also Greenhouse, supra note 
304 (suggesting J. Murphy’s reliance on Justice Posner’s analysis in reversing his own legal 
analysis from that of the previous Common Cause decisions).  Further adopting the language 
of Rokita, the court stated, “the legislature has wide latitude in determining the problems it 
wishes to address and the manner in which it desires to address them.”  Id. at *48 (quoting 
Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 829). 
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standing,305 the court’s dramatic change of course from its previous 
opinions and strong reliance on Rokita highlights judicial confusion 
regarding how to approach constitutional challenges to state voter ID 
laws.306  It also underscores the critical importance of submitting strong 
evidentiary support of voter disenfranchisement in order to encourage 
courts to strike down the laws under strict scrutiny analysis. 
On September 25, 2007, the United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita to decide the issues therein 
in early 2008.307  While it is impossible to predict with certainty the 
outcome of the Court’s decision, the author predicts that the Court will 
likely adopt much of the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning and uphold the 
Indiana voter ID law under Burdick-rational basis review.  First, the 
Court’s selection of Rokita to discuss constitutional challenges to voter ID 
laws presents a relatively easy case for the Court if it wishes to uphold 
Indiana’s law, due to the “weak” evidentiary record of voter 
disenfranchisement presented in that case.308  Indeed, this Note has 
attempted to caution future litigators of the evidentiary pitfalls plaguing 
constitutional challenges to voter ID laws, using the Rokita case as an 
example of what not to do.  Second, the timing of the Court’s hearing and 
decision, shortly before the 2008 presidential election, suggests the likely 
outcome of the Court’s decision.  In Purcell v. Gonzalez, the Court rapidly 
                                                 
305 See id. at *41.  Accordingly, this Note’s discussion regarding the previous Common 
Cause rulings remains useful.  The reader is cautioned, however, to note the court’s change 
in approach toward the evidence submitted by the plaintiffs to prove voter 
disenfranchisement, pursuant to the bench trial in Common Cause III.  See generally Common 
Cause III, 2007 WL 2601438, *37-49. 
306 See Common Cause III at *46-47 (The court goes to great lengths in its attempt to 
distinguish its analysis from it previous opinions in which the court granted two 
preliminary injunctions against the Georgia voter ID law, claiming that the evidentiary 
standards are more strict at the trial stage and highlighting the state’s efforts to educate 
voters regarding the new requirement).  See also Legal Challenges to New Voter-ID Laws 
Should be Resolved Before Next Round of National Elections to Avoid Chaos, GRAND RAPIDS 
PRESS, Oct. 7, 2007, at A14 (arguing that Supreme Court resolution of the issue is necessary 
to avoid confusion in the 2008 presidential election); Reasonable Voter ID Laws, WASH. 
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2007, at A16. 
307 See 2007 WL 1999963; 2007 WL 1999941; see also Greenhouse, supra note 304.  The 
appeal consolidated Indiana Dem. Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775 (S.D. Ind. 2006), and 
Crawford v. Marion Co. Elec. Bd., 2007 WL 16194 (7th Cir. 2007).  Id. 
308 A strong record of voter disenfranchisement has proved critical for the adoption of 
strict scrutiny analysis in all of the cases decided thus far.  Indeed, the constitutional 
challenges made against the Georgia and Missouri laws had more sufficiently developed 
evidentiary records, presented stronger arguments for adopting strict scrutiny either 
outright or under Burdick analysis, and would likely have made for a more robust 
discussion on the merits by the Supreme Court had the Court chosen to hear or consolidate 
its 2008 Rokita hearing with one of those cases. 
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intervened to reinstate Arizona’s voter ID law, cautioning that removing 
the state voter ID law so close to the 2006 primary elections would likely 
cause more disenfranchisement than the law itself.309  With nearly half of 
the states currently employing voter ID requirements in one form or 
another, common sense and the Court’s past jurisprudence suggests that 
the Court is highly unlikely to call into doubt numerous laws so close to 
a major election.  
Third, and most unfortunate, the ideological makeup of the Court 
may play a significant role in determining the outcome.  As with all state 
voter ID laws, the Indiana law passed along strict party lines.310  The 
legislative split highlights a partisan divide and suggests that the real 
controversy over state voter ID laws concerns political power and not the 
prevention of voter fraud nor the protection of the rights of society’s 
most politically vulnerable.  Similarly, the Seventh Circuit Rokita court 
was divided along political appointment lines in both decisions to grant 
appeal from the District Court and to uphold the law.311  In an era of 
increasing partisanship, although lamentable, it would be overly-
idealistic to avoid taking the ideological composition of the Court into 
account when predicting outcome.312  Recognizing the harm caused 
when the rights of society’s most politically vulnerable become a 
“political football” for any political party, however, the author hopes 
that the Court’s decision in Rokita—regardless of outcome—will expose 
the underlying partisan motives for and against state voter ID laws, will 
                                                 
309 Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 5 (2006). 
310 See generally supra Part II. 
311 See Adam Liptak, Fear but Few Facts In Debate on Voter IDs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2007, 
at A12; Voter ID, BUCKS CO. COURIER TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007, at A10 (quoting the Seventh 
Circuit dissenting opinion, “[t]he Indiana voter photo ID law is a not-too-thinly-veiled 
attempt to discourage election-day turnout by certain folks believed to skew Democratic.”). 
312 See, e.g., The Roberts Court Returns, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2007. 
The Supreme Court begins its new term as bitterly divided as it has 
ever been.  There are three hardened camps: four very conservative 
justices, four liberals, and a moderate conservative, Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, hovering in between.  The division into rigid blocs is 
unfortunate, because it makes the court seem more like a political body 
than a legal one. . . . Today, the justices seem just as political, wrapping 
their views on controversial social issues in neutral-sounding legal 
doctrines.  The case that will most test the court’s ability to rise above 
partisanship is a challenge to Indiana’s voter ID law. . . . If the justices 
act as umpires and call balls and strikes, this term could produce some 
real victories in voting rights . . . It could result in some terrible 
setbacks  . . .  however, if . . .  the court is calling balls and strikes but 
has moved the strike zone far to the right.” 
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rise above any real and perceived ideological divides within its own 
ranks, and will blindly balance the competing interests.   
If the Court does uphold Indiana’s voter ID law as predicted, the 
author encourages future litigators to consider the potential for a narrow 
interpretation of the Court’s decision.  In particular, if the Court justifies 
the use of rational basis due to the weak evidentiary record of voter 
disenfranchisement, the Rokita decision may be distinguishable in future 
constitutional challenges to voter ID laws.  In particular, litigators would 
be well-advised to assemble more sufficiently developed evidentiary 
records of disenfranchisement in order to advocate for more stringent 
judicial analysis in future challenges.  In such cases, the author hopes 
that this Note will remain a useful tool for understanding the evidentiary 
pitfalls plaguing previous challenges and serve as a blueprint for 
constructing stronger records and, thus, more effective constitutional 
challenges in the future.  
Kelly T. Brewer313 
                                                 
313  Dedicated to all of those who “speak [] for those who cannot speak for 
themselves, for the rights of all who are destitute.”  Be encouraged; “[s]peak up 
and judge fairly; defend the rights of the poor and needy.”  Proverbs 31:8-9. 
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